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We analyze the pricing problem of credit card issuers when setting per-
transaction fees for payments and interest rates for the credit associated with
these cards. By considering the issuer’s incentives coming from the credit
market, we provide a new explanation to the widely observed phenomenon
of credit card rewards. Issuers induce higher demand for the credit function
of their cards by lowering per-transaction fees, even to negative levels. In
addition, by assuming that some consumers face a form of behavioral bias,
consistent with recent empirical findings in financial markets, we develop a
new explanation for the interest rate exhibiting some degree of stickiness
in this market. Finally, we argue that interest rates are independent of
interchange fees and that interchange fee regulation should take into account
the costs and benefits of different forms of credit.
Keywords: credit card rewards, interchange fees, interest rates.
JEL Classifications: L11, E42.
1 Introduction
We study the relationship between the price charged by credit card issuers for the
payment feature of their cards and the interest rate associated with the “revolving”
credit feature of those cards.1 Previous literature has often omitted the issuers’
∗I’m grateful to Wilfried Sand-Zantman, Yassine Lefouili, Bruno Jullien, Martin Peitz, the
participants of the EARIE 2016 conference in Lisbon, for helpful comments and suggestions. I
would like to acknowledge financial support from CONICYT "Becas Chile" and the Jean-Jacques
Laffont Foundation.
†Ph.D. Student, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse,
France: jheresig@gmail.com.
1Revolving credit refers to a product that charges a given interest rate based on outstanding
credit balance on credit accounts.
1
incentives arising from interest rate revenues, and we argue that such incentives
can explain some of the observed outcomes in this market, such as consumer
rewards and interest rate stickiness. In fact, about 40% of the revenues from
credit card issuers in the U.S. come from interest rates.2 In the U.S. market,
where consumers possess more than 360 million credit card accounts, making, on
average, 120 payments a year for a total value of USD 11,000 and holding more
than 1,000 billion dollars in outstanding revolving credit, this issue is of significant
importance.3
To explore this relationship, we develop a multi-product model of credit cards
in which an issuer offers cards as a payment method and as a form of credit.
Consumers decide first whether to own a credit card and then whether to use the
credit associated with the card. They have outside options for both products,
namely cash for the payment feature and an exogenous credit market for the loan.
We include a behavioral assumption for some consumers, where they do not take
into account the interest rate charged by issuers and make decisions based only
on per-transaction fees, consistent with recent findings on consumer behavior in
credit markets. For example, Zaki (2018) finds that consumers not only fail to take
“hidden” prices into consideration when choosing credit cards but actually cannot
translate interest rates to real financial obligations. Another recent example is
Heidhues and Koszegi (2015), who investigate the welfare losses of firms exploiting
behavioral biases from credit card consumers.
This model allows us to provide explanations for some interesting features of
this market. First, per-transaction fees might be negative in equilibrium, meaning
that issuers offer rewards to consumers for using cards as a payment instrument.
Our model explains this broadly observed phenomenon by showing that issuers
induce higher demand to the credit characteristic of their cards by lowering the
per-transaction fees, even to negative levels. The more profitable the credit market
is, the more incentives issuers have to offer credit card rewards to consumers. This
result is consistent with the fact that issuers earn significant revenues from interest
rates. Therefore, we provide a new explanation for the existence of credit card
rewards in the credit card market.
Second, and as long as there exist at least a minimal fraction of naive consumers
in the market, interest rates exhibit some stickiness: for a wide range of parameters,
they remain independent of the marginal cost of credit, of the marginal cost of
card payments and of the interchange fee. The existence of naive consumers makes
it optimal for issuers to compete in per-transaction fees and not in interest rates.
2In 2016, interest income from credit cards was USD 63.4 billion from a total of USD 163
billion.
3Data from the year 2017. For more information see http://www.federalreserve.gov.
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In equilibrium, the interest rate can only take one of two values, namely a “low”
interest rate given by an indifference condition for sophisticated consumers with
the exogenous credit market, or a “high” interest rate given by the maximum
regulated rate that extracts the most profits from naive consumers. Given that
the decision to own a card precedes the decision of asking for a loan, when setting
interest rates, the only important information for issuers is the share of naive
consumers and the relative profitability of both possible interest rates. Therefore,
for a wide range of values, the equilibrium interest rate remains independent of
the marginal cost of credit, and it’s always independent of the interchange fee.
This result also allows us to evaluate interchange fee regulation. All around the
world, antitrust authorities and regulators have capped interchange fees for debit
and credit cards set by four-party systems. For example, after a long antitrust
case in Europe against Mastercard, both Visa and Mastercard have agreed to cap
their interchange fees to around 0.3% for credit cards, while the Reserve Bank
of Australia cut to half the interchange fees in that country in 2003 (to around
0.5%).4 In the United States, the Durbin Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010 capped the debit card interchange fees.5 However, the relationship between
interchange fees and per-transaction fees with the credit market associated with
credit cards has not been studied in detail. Our second result means that interest
rates are independent of variations on the interchange fees, a result that contributes
to the discussion of the regulation implemented in different countries.6
Finally, we extend the analysis of Rochet and Tirole (2011) and compare the
socially optimal interchange fee with the interchange fee set by payment systems
maximizing issuers’ profits, under the assumption of full merchant internalization.
Under such an assumption, retailers take into account the average consumer ben-
efits of using cards when deciding whether to accept cards, and they show that
this result holds in a variety of competitive settings. We extend their analysis and
argue that, as higher interchange fees reduce the per-transaction fees charged to
consumers, inducing a higher demand for both, the payment feature and the credit
characteristic of credit cards, interchange fee regulation should take into account
4The interchange fees are usually paid from the acquiring bank to the issuing bank for each
transaction made through the payment system.
5Other examples are Canada, Israel, Mexico, Spain, and others. For more details see Bradford
and Hayashi (2008).
6See The Economic Impact of Interchange Fee Regulation in the UK (2013) available at
http://www.europe-economics.com/publications/28062013-final-report–for-distribution.pdf, and
The Effects of the Mandatory Decrease of Interchange Fees in Spain (2012), The Economic
Impact of Interchange Fee Regulation in the UK (2013) available at http://www.europe-
economics.com/publications/28062013-final-report–for-distribution.pdf, and The Effects of the
Mandatory Decrease of Interchange Fees in Spain (2012), Reserve Bank of Australia An-
nual Report on Payment Systems available at http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-
reports/psb/2006/html/ for different arguments on this issuer
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the social costs and benefits of the different forms of credit.
To simplify the exposition, we first build a monopoly issuer model and derive
all of our results. Then, we extend to consider the cases of competition between
differentiated issuers in a pure single-homing and a pure multi-homing settings,
showing that our main results are consistent with different market structures.
Following previous literature, consumers obtain a heterogeneous benefit of using
cards as a payment device. To consider the credit market in our model, we assume
that all consumers need a loan of an exogenous amount of D, and they always
repay their debts. The acquiring side of the market is assumed to be competitive.
Therefore, the interchange fee is fully passed-through to retailers. In the following
section, we relate our work with the literature.
Related Literature
Several papers have analyzed the outcomes of the credit card market and the role
of the interchange fee and its regulation. This paper borrows closely from Rochet
and Tirole (2011) the way of modeling cardholder’s and retailer’s benefits of us-
ing cards over cash, while we extend to add the credit feature to the model. In
their paper, the authors explain why cards are often understood as “must take” by
merchants. They also provide a benchmark for the regulation of the interchange
fee, the tourist test. They show that retailers may accept cards even when these
cards raise their operational costs, due to partial internalization of buyer surplus.
They also show that, in many cases, the privately optimal interchange fee will be
too high, producing an excessive use of cards as a payment device. Wright (2012)
goes further in the last argument and show conditions under which the privately
set interchange fee will be unambiguously biased against retailers. Bedre-Defolie
and Calvano (2013), in a model of usage and participation benefits heterogeneity
on both consumers and merchants, also show that a network aiming to maximize
profits oversubsidize the usage of cards by cardholders while overcharging mer-
chants, mainly due to the fact that consumers choose both membership and usage
while retailers only choose membership.
The closest papers in the literature are Chakravorti and To (2007) and Rochet
and Wright (2010), who also take into account the credit functionality of cards.
In the first paper, the authors show that merchants accept credit cards because
they increase sales today in contrast with tomorrow. Thus merchants are willing
to accept higher merchants discounts. In equilibrium, all merchants accept cards.
Still, by doing so, they are worse off, as in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. They fo-
cus more on retailers than on issuers’ incentives and have no interest rate in their
model. In the latter paper, the authors also take into account the credit func-
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tionality of credit cards and show that a monopoly network sets an interchange
fee that is higher than the one maximizing consumer surplus. They also focus
on the retailer side of the market by looking for equilibria where credit cards are
accepted even when stores can provide credit for themselves. They analyze the
impact of interchange fees on retail prices while simplifying the issuing side of the
market. Therefore, there is no explicit interest rate either in their model. In con-
trast with those papers, this work focus in the issuing bank and on understanding
the relationship between the per-transaction fees and the interest rates from banks
perspectives, therefore providing a tool to explain credit card rewards and interest
rate stickiness in the market, while also analyzing interchange fees in this context.
Both works are thus complementary to this article.
Regarding the issue of credit card rewards, previous results in the literature
show that rewards appear if the convenience benefit for merchants exceed the costs
of the transactions (Rochet and Tirole, 2011, Beldre and Calvano, 2013) or due to
oligopolistic competition by retailers, non-surcharging by merchants and network
competition (Hayashi, 2008), among others. This work provides an alternative
explanation for this widely observed phenomenon through an alternative approach.
Finally, the behavior of naive consumers borrows from the analysis of Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) on shrouded attributes and add-on pricing. More recently,
Heidhues and Koszegi (2015) evaluate the welfare losses of issuers exploiting naive
consumers in the United States, and Heidhues and Koszegi (2017) analyze how
firms can price discriminate according to consumers’ level of “naivete”. Their pri-
mary application is the credit market and focuses on price discrimination issues. In
contrast, we focus more on multi-product dimensions and interchange fee analysis
in a setting designed to explain outcomes in the credit card market. Armstrong
and Vickers (2012) build a similar model relative to consumers’ decision to have
current accounts associated with overdraft fees, which some consumers fail to inter-
nalize. Finally, we extend the literature on credit card interest rates being sticky,
as discussed by Ausubel (1991). However, the explanation of this phenomenon
is different and related to the existence of naive consumers, as is empirically ex-
plored by Zaki (2018), who shows that naive consumers exist in the credit card
market and provides some insights on the stickiness interest rates analogous to our
theoretical findings.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the
model, and we derive all of our results assuming there is a monopoly issuer, while
the level of the interchange fee is exogenously given in the market. Then, in Section
3, we analyze the socially and privately optimal interchange fees. In Section 4, we
show that our main results extend when we consider pure single-homing and pure
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multi-homing competition between two differentiated issuers. Finally, in Section
5, we provide some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a continuum of mass 1 of consumers demanding two products, namely
a payment device and some form of credit for an amount of money D, to use
them to purchase a basket of goods. The issuing bank M offers a credit card,
charging a per-transaction fee fM for each payment made with the card and an
interest rate rM per unit of money borrowed by consumers. This per-transaction
fee might be negative, meaning that the issuer gives rewards to consumers, in the
form of money in their cards or as goods and services offered by external firms.
Consumers use the credit to purchase a basket of goods providing utility v, and
they experience a convenience benefit of bb from the payment feature of credit
cards. This benefit is assumed to be heterogeneous and distributed over a closed
interval [bb, bb] following a cumulative distribution function H(·), with increasing
hazard rate. Both bounds can take positive or negative levels as long as bb > bb.
Consumers have outside options for both products. They can pay using cash,
which cost is normalized to 0. Consumers also have access to an exogenous credit
market that charges a fixed interest rate of r0. If consumers decide to use the
exogenous credit, they face a fixed and homogeneous cost of hb, representing,
for instance, within period impatience or transaction costs. Every consumer uses
either form of credit and always repay their debts (no default allowed).
We assume there are two types of consumers exhibiting different behaviors. Fol-
lowing Gabaix and Laibson (2006), a fraction γ of naive consumers make decisions
based only on per-transaction fees while still using some form of loan and paying
interest rates. The remainder fraction (1 − γ) of sophisticated consumers choose
their payment device and credit form taking into account both per-transaction
fees and having rational expectations over future interest rates. We assume that
0 < γ < 1 for simplicity in the exposition.7 We also assume that there exists an
exogenous maximum interest rate r that can be charged by banks due to regulation
or other social constraints. Both naive and sophisticated consumers are assumed
to have the same distribution of convenience benefits bb.
Given the description above, consumers have three options: 1) to pay with the
card and use the associated revolving credit, 2) to pay with the card and use the
external loan, and 3) to use cash and use the external loan. The utility derived
7When γ = 1 the model is solved differently and the results are straightforward.
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from each choice is respectively given by
U1 = v + bb − fM − (rM ·D) (1)
U2 = v + bb − fM − (r0 ·D)− hb (2)
U3 = v − (r0 ·D)− hb. (3)
Retailers receive a homogeneous convenience benefit of br from payments with
cards and they are not allowed to surcharge payments with those cards.8 The ac-
quiring market is assumed to be competitive, implying that the merchant discount
rate m is given by m = ca +a, where ca is the per-transaction cost of the acquirer,
and a is the interchange fee, defined as a payment from the acquiring bank to the
issuing bank each time a card transaction is made.9
Assume in this section that the interchange fee a is exogenously given. The
timing of the game is the following:
• t=1: The issuer sets the per-transaction fee fM . Then, consumers choose
whether to own a card or not.
• t=2: The issuer sets the interest rate for the revolving credit rM . Then,
consumers choose which form of credit to use and purchase the basket of
goods. Consumers who do not own cards always use the external loan.
Consumers choosing to own a credit card in the first period will always use it as
a payment device when they purchase, while they still choose which form of credit
to use. We assume that the issuer cannot commit to a level of the interest rate
in t = 1 and he cannot price discriminate between consumers. For an in-depth
analysis of price discrimination issues with naive consumers, see Heidhues and
Koszegi (2017). Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis
Define




as the interest rate that makes sophisticated consumers holding a card indifferent
between the revolving credit associated with the card and the exogenous loan
choice in the second period, where we assume that r > r.10 Then, in t = 2, it can
8Usually there is a non-surcharge rule by networks like Visa and Mastercard. In countries
where this rule has been eliminated, there is little evidence of surcharging by merchants.
9The analysis below could be extended to acquirers having a positive margin. The critical
assumption is that an increase in the interchange fee will increase the merchant discount rate
charged by them.
10If they use the outside option they pay D · r0 + hb which is equal to D · r.
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only be optimal for the monopolist to charge either rM = r or rM = r. Given the
card owning decision of consumers, in the second period, the monopolist chooses
between serving every consumer in the credit market at a “low” interest rate or
serving only naive consumers at a “high” interest rate. Any interest rate strictly
greater than r would lead to only naive consumers using the revolving credit.
Therefore, it would be in the monopolist interest to set the highest price possible,
in this case, r. If M sets any rate lower or equal than r, every consumer uses the
revolving credit, so it is more profitable to set r.
We start by assuming that the monopolist sets rM = r at t = 2, and sophis-
ticated consumers correctly anticipate this price. Then, in the first period, the
demand for card payments is derived from the condition bb ≥ fM ,11 for both sophis-
ticated and naive consumers. This implies a demand function equal to 1−H(fM ).
We assume that every consumer having a card will use the revolving credit at
this interest rate, as they are indifferent between both types of loans. The profit
function for the monopolist in t = 1 is given by
Π(fM ; r) = (fM + a− ci)(1−H(fM )) +D(r − cc)(1−H(fM )), (5)
where a is the interchange fee, ci is the constant marginal cost of a payment
transaction and cc is the cost per unit of money lent. Taking the first-order
conditions with respect to fM and solving for the optimal per-transaction fee
results in
f∗M = ci − a+
1−H(f∗M )
h(f∗M )
−D(r − cc). (6)
The increasing hazard rate assumption ensures that the first-order condition will
provide a unique solution to the monopolist problem. Next, assume that the mo-
nopolist charges r in t = 2 and sophisticated consumers anticipate this price. In
this case, sophisticated consumers expect to use the exogenous loan. The demands
for cards, for both naive and sophisticated consumers, is again given by the con-
dition bb ≥ fM , but now only naive consumers will use the revolving credit. The
monopolist’s profit function is given by
Π(fM ; r) = (fM + a− ci)(1−H(fM )) + γD(r − cc)(1−H(fM )). (7)
Solving for the optimal per-transaction fees we have
f∗M = ci − a+
1−H(f∗M )
h(f∗M )
− γD(r − cc). (8)
The following result characterizes the monopolist optimal decision in the first stage:
11Details on the derivation of demand functions in appendix 1.
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Lemma 1. At t = 1, the monopolist sets per-transaction fees given by expression
(6) or (8). In any case:
• The per-transaction fee charged by the monopolist is strictly decreasing on
the interchange fee.
• If the expected revenues in the credit market are high enough, the per-transaction
fee is negative.
Proof. See the analysis above for the derivation of the optimal per-transaction fee
for each possible interest rate. This fee is strictly decreasing in the interchange
fee a directly from the implicit function theorem and the increasing hazard rate
assumption for H(·). The revenues coming from the credit market are, for each
possible interest rate, D(r − cc) and γD(r − cc). Due to the increasing hazard
rate assumption, if these terms are high enough, the equilibrium expression for
the per-transaction fee is negative.
The per-transaction fee charged to consumers is decreasing with the profits
made on the credit market, as the monopolist has incentives to induce demand to
the credit feature of its credit card to increase its revenues through interest rate
charges. As only consumers holding a credit card might use the revolving credit at
t = 2, it is optimal for the monopolist to lower the per-transaction fee charged to
consumers, even to negative levels, if the credit market is profitable enough. How
profitable is the credit market depends on the amount of debt that consumers are
expected to have, the conditions of the exogenous loan market and the number of
naive consumers in the market. This result is consistent with the fact that issuers
make a significant share of their income in the credit card market through the
credit feature of their cards.
Lemma 1 provides a new explanation for the widely observed credit card re-
wards in the credit card market. So far, the literature had focused on the first
terms of expressions (6) and (8), given by ci−a. For example, Bedre and Calvano
(2013), find that the optimal per-transaction fee set by the issuer is ci− a. There-
fore, rewards are less likely to exist in their model and only if the interchange fee
is higher than the marginal cost of providing card payments on the issuer side.12
Next, we study whether the high or the low interest rate equilibrium is the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game:
12Similarly, Rochet and Tirole (2011) find that the optimal per-transaction fee is ci − a + k
where k is a fixed margin of the issuer, making it even more unlikely to obtain as a result the
widely spread reward observed on the credit card markets. Rochet and Wright (2010) assume a
similar expression for the per-transaction fee in their model.
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Proposition 1. Assume that the distribution H(·) has an increasing hazard rate.
Then, for a given level of the interchange fee a, there are two possible equilibriums:
• A low interest rate equilibrium with r∗M = r and f∗M characterized by expres-
sion (6).
• A high interest rate equilibrium with r∗M = r and f∗M characterized by ex-
pression (8).
The low interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
γ ≤ (r − cc)(r − cc)
≤ 1 (9)
Else, the high interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. See appendix 1.
Whether the high or the low interest rate equilibrium hold, depends on the
share of naive consumers and on the relative profitability on the credit market of
charging a high or a low interest rate. If the share of naive consumers is high, the
monopolist has more incentives to charge a high interest rate, as naive consumers
will always pay this higher price. In contrast, the monopolist loses relatively little
demand from not serving the sophisticated consumers, and vice versa.
This condition is similar to the one obtained by Armstrong and Vickers (2012)
in their analysis of current accounts attached to overdraft fees. The main dif-
ferences are that in their model, the goods are tied and have no outside option,
while we allow outside options for both goods, and in their model, sophisticated
consumers must incur in some effort to learn the less salient price. However, the
intuition of the condition that compares the share of naive consumers with the
relative profitability of different options for the firm is the same.
Finally, following the result derived in Proposition 1, we discuss the equilibrium
interest rate and its determinants:
Lemma 2. The equilibrium interest rate is independent of the marginal cost of
the payment feature of the card and independent of the interchange fee. Moreover:
• If the marginal cost of providing credit increases, the high interest rate equi-
librium becomes more likely.
• If the regulated interest rate r decreases, the high interest rate equilibrium
becomes less likely.
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• If the outside option credit market becomes more competitive, meaning r0
decreases, the high interest rate equilibrium becomes more likely.
Proof. Direct inspection of the condition leading to each possible equilibrium in
Proposition 1.
The condition leading to a high or to a low interest rate equilibrium is indepen-
dent of the interchange fee and of the marginal cost of providing a card payment
ci. Therefore, interchange fee regulation doesn’t affect the equilibrium interest
rate. The only effect of interchange fee regulation in our model is an increase in
the per-transaction fee and lower usage of credit cards as a payment device and as
a credit feature. We discuss the welfare implications of such a policy in the next
section.
We also analyze the impact of the marginal cost of credit cc on the probability
of having a high or a low interest rate equilibrium. If this cost goes up, the share
of naive consumers needed to have a high interest rate equilibrium is smaller,
making it more likely to hold. The intuition is that a higher marginal cost of
giving credit makes the lower interest case relatively less profitable than the high
interest rate case, increasing the incentives of the monopolist to charge a high
interest rate. However, as long as this condition is not reversed, the interest rate
doesn’t change. Therefore, for a wide range of parameters and marginal costs, the
interest rate is sticky with respect to changes in the marginal cost of credit. This
result is consistent with the analysis of Ausubel (1991), but for different reasons.
The explanation is consistent with the findings of Zaki (2018), where she argues
that behavioral components, such as consumers being unable to transform interest
rates into real financial obligations, might explain the stickiness of interest rates
in the credit card market. In our model, the fact that the decision of owning a
card is previous to the credit decision and that the interest rate is determined
based either on an indifference condition with an outside option or either by the
maximum regulated interest rate, results in interest rate stickiness.13
Using this result, we can also analyze the effects of potential regulation, such
as reducing the maximum regulated interest rate r. This regulation would make it
more likely that the low interest equilibrium holds by reducing the profitability of
the high interest rate equilibrium. This kind of regulation is often criticized based
13Note that we assume that the marginal cost of credit is constant. If this marginal cost would
be decreasing in the amount of credit given to consumers, then capping interchange fees would
increase per-transaction fees, reduce demand for cards and increase the marginal cost of credit
for the monopolist. In this case, interchange fee regulation might generate a switch from low
to high interest rates. Whether this effect is significant in reality is left as an open question for
empirical work, and it is outside of the results of this paper.
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on the argument that such a regulation would make issuers to improve other fees
in response. Our multi-product model allows us to investigate this criticism and,
in fact, show that such a regulation would increase per-transaction fees. Whether
this is better for welfare and consumers is studied in the following section.
3 Socially and Privately Optimal Interchange Fees
3.1 Privately optimal interchange fees
In this section, we provide a simplified analysis to show how adding the credit
feature of credit cards implies that additional variables should be taken into con-
sideration when analyzing interchange fee regulation. For simplicity in the expo-
sition, we assume that the low interest rate equilibrium holds, meaning that every
consumer holding a card uses the card as a payment device and as a credit form.
Rochet and Tirole (2011) show that under different competitive environments,
retailers are willing to accept a higher merchant discount rate m than their direct
convenience benefits, due to what they call “merchant internalization”, meaning
that merchants at least partially internalize the cardholders benefits of their card
acceptance policy. Following their work, define vb ≡ E[bb − f |bb ≥ f ] as the net
cardholder benefit per card payment. These authors show that retailers accept
cards if and only if
m ≤ br + vb(f), (10)
where f is the per-transaction fee charged to consumers and br is the homoge-
neous benefit that retailers obtain from accepting a card payment. This means
that merchants fully internalize consumers’ benefits of using cards in their card
acceptance decision. Also, both in their work and ours, issuers’ profits are always
increasing on the interchange fee, as it is an exogenous source of income. There-
fore, a payment platform aiming to maximize issuers’ profits, will set the highest
interchange fee subject to merchants accepting cards, given by m = br + vb(f).
Given the competitive acquiring market assumption, this implies an interchange
fee equal to
a∗p = br + vb(f)− ca. (11)
This result is the same as in Rochet and Tirole (2011), as the privately optimal
interchange is set according to the merchants’ participation constraint and, as con-
sumers are left indifferent between both credit options, there is no extra merchant
internalization from the credit feature of credit cards.
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3.2 Socially optimal interchange fees
To define the social welfare function, it’s important to mention the sources of social
benefit and cost in this model. Social benefits are given by convenience benefits bb
for consumers and br for retailers. The social costs are given by ci, cc, ca and hb.
We also assume that the exogenous loan has a cost of cl per unit of credit given.





(bb + br − (ci + ca + (D(cc − cl)− hb)))dH(bb). (12)
Note that this welfare function is relative to a base case where consumers use
cash and the outside credit option. Maximizing with respect to the equilibrium
per-transaction fee we obtain
fW∗ = ci + ca − br︸ ︷︷ ︸
Same as Rochet and Tirole (2011)
+ D(cc − cl)− hb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extra terms from credit feature
. (13)
The per-transaction fee that maximizes total welfare is divided into two terms. The
first term aims at balancing the social benefits and costs of the payment feature
of the card and is the same as the one obtained by Rochet and Tirole (2011). In
addition, by considering the credit characteristic of cards, we get an additional
term D(cc − cl) − hb. The first part of this new term depends on the difference
between the marginal cost of the revolving credit of credit cards and the marginal
cost of the exogenous loan. If the marginal cost associated with credit cards is
higher, the socially maximizing fee is also higher in order to reduce the demand for
this form of credit that is more expensive to produce. The last term represents the
transaction costs incurred by consumers when going to the exogenous loan market.
If this is very costly for consumers, the per-transaction fee should go down to avoid
such a cost for consumers.
This optimal per-transaction fee can be implemented by the regulator by setting
the appropriate interchange fee depending on the distribution of match values
bb. For any distribution, we observe that the privately optimal interchange fee
does not take into account the terms associated with the credit feature of cards,
while the social maximizing per-transaction fee does. Therefore, when regulating
interchange fees, the regulator must take into account the different costs of credit
and transaction costs for consumers, as interchange fee regulation will affect per-
transaction fees, which, in turn, will affect how demand is allocated between these
different forms of credit.
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4 Extension: issuer competition
In this section, we show how our main results extend to the cases of pure single-
homing competition, that is, assuming that consumers choose and hold only one
card, and to the case of pure multi-homing competition, meaning that consumers
always own the cards of both competing issuers.
4.1 Pure single-homing competition
Consider two firms, A and B, that compete for consumers in a Hotelling line. The
total amount of consumers is normalized toM+2K. To introduce outside options
to both products while taking into account product differentiation, instead of cash,
we introduce two exogenous firms A′ and B′ offering only the payment product
at an exogenously given per-transaction fee f0.14 As is standard in Hotelling
models, all firms provide a homogeneous benefit bb of the payment feature of cards
minus the transport cost given by their location. These firms represent alternative
payment cards, such as debit cards, that also provide the benefit bb to consumers,
but without giving the credit option. Firms A and B are located symmetrically
in the middle of the line at a distance M from each other, while A′ and B′ are
located in the extremes of each side of the line, at a distance K from the main
firms, as we show in Figure 1.
The linear transport cost is given by t and consumers still have the choice of
getting a loan at a rate r0 at the exogenous credit market, incurring in a transaction
cost of hb. We impose in this section that consumers can only choose to have only
one card between the offers of firm A and B and the outside options, representing
a pure single-homing case. The timing of the game is the following:
• t=1: Issuers A and B set per-transaction fees simultaneously. Then, con-
sumers choose between the cards from firm A, firm B or one of the outside
option firms.
• t=2: Issuers A and B set interest rate for the revolving credit simultaneously.
Then, consumers choosing outside option firms use the exogenous loan, while
consumers with cards from A or B choose between their firm’s revolving
credit and the exogenous loan.
Suppose that a given consumer chooses the card from firm A or B. In the
second period, this consumer can only use the revolving credit associated with his
card or the exogenous loan. At this stage, firms “stop” competing with each other
14This is a variation of the Hotelling model, similar to that in Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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Figure 1: Hotelling Competition with Outside Options
and only compete with the outside option credit. Therefore, the only relevant
options for them in t = 2 are to serve all of their consumers at the interest rate r
or serve only their naive consumers in the credit market at r.
Consumers’ demand for cards at t = 1 now depends on their expectation on the
interest rate charged by both firms in the second period. Focusing on a symmetric
equilibrium,15and denoting by rei and re−i the expected interest rates of issuer i
and its rival, the demand for cards in t = 1 for firm i is given by (details of this
derivation are found in Appendix 2)





+ f−i + f02t −
D(1− γ)(2rei − re−i − r)
2t . (14)
Suppose first that both firms charge the low interest rate at t = 2. Therefore,
consumers expect to use the revolving credit associated with the card they pick.
Then, the profit function of issuer i is
Πi(fi; r) = Di(fi; rei )(fi + a− ci) +Di(fi; rei )D(r − cc). (15)
Taking the first-order conditions for each firm with respect to fi, and using the
fact that consumers have rational expectations, implies a candidate symmetric
15In fact, an asymmetric equilibrium where one firm charges the high interest rate and the
other the low interest rate does not exist in this game.
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equilibrium per-transaction fee of
f∗i =
t(M +K) + f0 − 2(a− ci)− 2D(r − cc)
3 . (16)
Analogously, assuming that issuers will charge r in t = 2, sophisticated consumers
expect to go to the exogenous loan. Therefore, the profit function of firm i is now
Πi(fi; r) = Di(fi; r)(fi + a− ci) + γDi(fi; r)D(r − cc), (17)
while the candidate per-transaction fees for a symmetric equilibrium is now
f∗i =
t(M +K) + f0 − 2(a− ci)− 2γD(r − cc)
3 . (18)
The following Proposition characterizes the unique subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the game:
Proposition 2. In the described Hotelling model, when consumers single-home,
and for a given level of the interchange fee a, there are two possible symmetric
equilibriums:
• A low interest rate equilibrium with r∗i = r and f∗i given by (16), for i ∈
{A,B}.
• A high interest rate equilibrium with r∗i = r and f∗i given by (18), for i ∈
{A,B}.
The low interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
γ ≤ (r − cc)(r − cc)
≤ 1 (19)
Else, the high interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. The argument follows the same steps as the ones for proposition 1 in ap-
pendix 1, using the demand functions for the competition case.
As in the monopoly case, we have two possible equilibriums, one with a high
interest rate and one with a low interest rate. The condition under which these
equilibriums hold is the same as in the monopoly case because when consumers
are assumed to single-home, they are captive to their own credit card supplier in
t = 2. Therefore their credit choice reduces to using their card revolving credit or
the credit market outside option. At this stage, each firm faces the same trade-
off as the monopolist: whether to serve every consumer at a low interest rate or
only to naive consumers at a high interest rate. This trade-off is again defined by
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the relative amount of naive consumers in the population relative to the possible
margins in the credit market.
This result shows that, even in a competitive environment, if the credit market
is profitable enough, per-transaction fees may be negative. Therefore, the explana-
tion for credit card rewards extends to competition when single-homing is imposed.
Moreover, as the condition leading to each equilibrium is the same, the result for
interest rate stickiness also remains unchanged in this competitive environment.
4.2 Pure Multi-Homing Competition
Consider a variation of the Hotelling model of the last section, in which sophisti-
cated consumers hold both cards from the beginning and must choose which one
to use at each stage. In the case of naive consumers, this assumption is innocuous
because they make decisions only based on per-transaction fees. The timing is
now the following:
• t=1: Issuers A and B set per-transaction fees simultaneously. Both types of
consumers hold cards from firms A and B.
• t=2: Issuers A and B set interest rate for the revolving credit simultaneously.
Then, sophisticated consumers observe both per-transaction fees and interest
rates and choose whether to pay using one of the firms’ cards or the outside
option and which form of credit to use. Naive consumers choose only based
on per-transaction fees.
The only restriction for consumers in this section is that, in order to use the
revolving credit associated with a card, they must use that card as a payment
device. Any other combination of cards and outside options is allowed.
The main difference with the single-homing case is that sophisticated consumers
will choose considering the best combination of fees and observed interest rates in
t = 2. Therefore, different interest rates charged by issuers in t = 2 may influence
sophisticated consumers’ choice of their payment device.
Demands for card payments are the same as in the last section but considering
observed interest rates instead of expected ones. The set of strategies for issuers
is now broader, as now they can attract more consumers by charging an interest
rate lower than r. It’s still never profitable for issuers to charge anything between
r and r, because sophisticated consumers will go to the outside option and naive
consumers could be furthered exploited by charging r. However, lowering the
interest rate to levels below r will attract demand from sophisticated consumers,
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in contrast with the single-homing case. Therefore, firms choose interest rates
either in the set [0, r] or equal to r.
Suppose first that issuers set interest rates in the interval [0, r]. Then, the






+ f−i + f02t −
D(1− γ)(2ri − r−i − r)
2t . (20)
When interest rates belong to the mentioned interval, every consumer demanding
the card of firm i will also use the revolving credit associated to that card. There-
fore, the problem in t = 2 is to maximize the following profit function with respect
to ri for any value of per-transaction fees fi, with the restriction that r∗i ∈ [0, r].
The profit function is
Π(ri; fi) = Di(ri; fi)(fi + a− ci +D(ri − cc)). (21)
Ignoring the restriction for the moment and solving for r∗i as a function of per-
transaction fees of both firms gives, as a result, a candidate interest rate of
r∗i =
5∆− (15− 8γ)fi + 2γf−i
15D(1− γ) , (22)
with ∆ ≡ (t(M +K)+f0)+ 5D(1−γ)(r+2cc)−10(1−γ)(a− ci). This candidate
symmetric equilibrium interest rate for issuer i is strictly decreasing on the per-
transaction fee fi.
Then, the maximization problem of the firms in t = 1 is to choose per-
transaction fees to maximize
Π(fi, r∗i , r∗−i) = Di(fi, r∗r , r∗−i)(fi + a− ci +D(r∗i − cc)). (23)
This profit function is strictly decreasing on per-transaction fees. Therefore, issuers
decrease per-transaction fees, which in turn increases interest rates charged in
t = 2. When the per-transaction fee is low enough, the interest rate charged
in t = 2 reaches r. At this rate, issuers do not have incentives to increase the
interest rate further, as they would lose all sophisticated consumers. However, by
decreasing the per-transaction fee, they still attract demand to their cards. They
continue to decrease per-transaction fees until they have no more incentives to do
so (details on Appendix 3). In equilibrium, the per-transaction fee is given by
f∗i =
t(M +K) + f0 − 2(a− ci)− 2D(r − cc)
3 . (24)
Note that this per-transaction fee is exactly the same than in the single homing
case. This means that the low interest equilibrium remains unchanged. The
intuition for this result is as follows: firms, given how interest rates will be affected
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by per-transaction fees in t = 2, always have incentives to lower per-transaction
fees in t = 1. Increasing them would lead to lower interest rates, lower demand and
lower profits. However, when they reach the per-transaction fee consistent with
the restriction of the maximization problem and with expression (22), firms still
have incentives to lower per-transaction fees, even if they can’t keep increasing the
interest rate. This process goes on until both firms set per-transaction fees equal
to expression (24) in equilibrium, which is the same expression for equilibrium
per-transaction fees than in the single homing case.
The explanation of this result comes from the existence of an outside option in
the credit market and the participation of naive consumers in the market. Even
a very low fraction of these consumers give banks’ incentives to always use per-
transaction fees in order to attract demand, while setting the highest interest rate
possible. The outside option in the credit market sets a cap on this interest rate
at the level r. These two factors make the multi-homing case equal to the single
homing case in the low interest rate equilibrium.
Assume now that the firm charges a high interest rate at t = 2. This means that
sophisticated consumers will use the outside option credit even when choosing the
card of either firm A or B. This means that firms maximize in t = 1 the following
profit function:
Π(fi; r) = Di(fi; r)(fi + a− ci) +Di(fi; r)γD(r − cc)) (25)
Solving for both firms:
f∗i =
t(M +K) + f0 − 2(a− ci)− 2Dγ(r − cc)
3 (26)
And r∗i = r.
Proposition 3. In the described Hotelling model, when consumers multi-home,
and for a given level of the interchange fee a, there are two possible symmetric
equilibriums:
• A low interest rate equilibrium with r∗i = r and f∗i given by (24), for i ∈
{A,B}.
• A high interest rate equilibrium with r∗i = r and f∗i given by (26), for i ∈
{A,B}.
The low interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
γ ≤ (r − cc)(r − cc)
≤ 1 (27)
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Else, the high interest rate equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. See appendix 3.
We observe that, again, if the credit market is profitable enough, per-transaction
fees may be negative. Therefore, the explanation for credit card rewards also ex-
tends to competition when multi-homing is imposed. Finally, as the condition
leading to each equilibrium is the same, the result for interest rate stickiness also
remains unchanged in this competitive environment.
5 Discussion and Final Remarks
We argue that studying the relationships between the payment market and its
transaction fees and between the credit market and its interest rates is important
mainly in two dimensions.
First, this relationship can explain some interesting phenomena observed in
the credit card market. Issuers offer credit card rewards to attract demand to
their cards and increase the usage of the associated form of credit, increasing their
revenues. This explanation is consistent with a significant share of the revenues
of a typical issuer in the U.S. coming from interest rates. Also, we provide an
alternative explanation to credit card stickiness, which has been a long studied
problem16. Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical analysis of
Zaki (2018).
Second, our model is useful when addressing credit card interchange fee regu-
lation. Caps on interchange fees have been implemented due to some agreement
on the fact that privately set interchange fees would be too high, generating an
over usage of payment cards and excessive costs for merchants. However, this
regulation may have a significant influence on the credit market associated with
payment cards, and these implications should be taken into account when eval-
uating this kind of policy. Interchange fee caps reduce the incentives for issuers
to induce more demand to their revolving credit associated with credit cards, and
therefore it increments the number of consumers going to the exogenous loan mar-
ket. If the transaction costs of going to the outside option market are too high
or if the convenience benefit from retailers from the revolving credit is also high,
reductions on interchange fees have the potential to reduce total welfare. Which
effects dominate in practice depends on the consumers’ and retailers’ behavior of
16See Ausubel (1991) for a much earlier discussion of this issue.
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a given market, and antitrust authorities should take these additional effects into
account when regulating interchange fees.
Appendix 1: Monopoly Section
Demand For Cards
Naive consumers do not observe or value differences on interest rates, valuing only
per-transaction fees. They will demand the card offered by the monopolist if and
only if
v + bb − fM ≥ v,
while sophisticated consumers only when
v + bb − fM −Dr ≥ v −Dr0 − hb,
if they expect an interest rate equal to r, meaning they will use the revolving
credit, or
v + bb − fM −Dr0 − h ≥ v − f0 −Dr0 − hb,
if they expect an interest rate strictly higher than r, meaning they will use the
outside option credit. In both cases, the condition defining the demand function
is given by
bb ≥ fM . (28)
Proof of Proposition 1
The expressions for both per-transaction fees and interest rates are already derived
above. To prove when each equilibrium holds, name fL∗M to the per-transaction
fee charged in the low interest rate and fH∗M to the fee charged in the high interest
equilibrium. Suppose first, that the low interest equilibrium is holding. Then, we
need that
Π(fL∗M , r) ≥ Π(fL∗M , r). (29)
This means that the monopolist won’t deviate to charge the high interest rate in
the second period. This condition is equivalent to
(fL∗M +a−ci)(1−H(fL∗M ))+βD(r−cc) ≥ (fL∗M +a−ci)(1−H(fL∗M ))+βγD(r−cc),
(30)
which is equivalent to γ ≤ (r−cc)(r−cc) .
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Appendix 2: Single-Homing Section
Demand For Cards
Call x1 the consumer indifferent between A and B, x2 the consumer indifferent
between A and A′ and x3 the consumer indifferent between B and B′. Assume
that a consumer to the left of A will never go to B and that a consumer to the
right of B will never go to A. The conditions to calculate x1, x2 and x3 are, for
sophisticated consumers, respectively
bb − fA −DreA − x1t = bb − fB −DreB − (M − x1)t
bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− x2t = bb − fA −DreB − (K − x2)t
bb − fB −DreB − x3t = bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− (K − x3)t.
Assuming that both reA and reB are weakly smaller than r, meaning that sophisti-
cated consumers using A or B expect to use the revolving credit. If the expected
rate is higher than r, consumers expect to go to the exogenous loan, meaning that
these relationships change to
bb − fA −Dr0 − h− x1t = bb − fB −Dr0 − h− (M − x1)t
bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− x2t = bb − fA −Dr0 − h− (K − x2)t
bb − fB −Dr0 − h− x3t = bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− (K − x3)t.
Finally, demands for sophisticated consumers are given by
DsA(fA; reA) = x1 +K − x2 (31)
DsB(fB ; reA) = M − x1 + x3. (32)
These relationships along with the definition of r result in the demands used in
section 3. Demands for naive consumers are derived analogously without taking






+ fB + f02t . (33)
Finally, total demand for firms A and B is given by Di(fi, rei ) = γDmi (fi) + (1−
γ)Dsi (fi; rei ).
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Appendix 3: Multi-Homing Section
Demand For Cards
Demands for cards are calculated just as in appendix 2 but with observed interest
rates instead of expected interest rates. Therefore, the conditions to calculate x1,
x2 and x3 are
bb − fA −DrA − x1t = bb − fB −DrB − (M − x1)t
bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− x2t = bb − fA −DrB − (K − x2)t
bb − fB −DrB − x3t = bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− (K − x3)t.
If observed interest rates are lower than r and
bb − fA −Dr0 − h− x1t = bb − fB −Dr0 − h− (M − x1)t
bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− x2t = bb − fA −Dr0 − h− (K − x2)t
bb − fB −Dr0 − h− x3t = bb − f0 −Dr0 − h− (K − x3)t.
If observed interest rates are higher than r. The rest of the calculations follows
the same steps as in the appendix 2.
Proof of proposition 3
Solving the problem of the firms in t = 2, means maximizing:
Π(ri; fi) = Di(fi, ri)(fi + a− ci +D(ri − cc)), (34)
with respect to ri, which first order condition is given by
tDi(fi, ri) = (1− γ)(fi + a− ci +D(ri − cc), (35)
for each firm. Solving this system yields the following interest rates as a function
of per-transaction fees
r∗i =
5(t(M +K) + f0) + 5D(1− γ)(r + 2cc)− 10(1− γ)(a− ci)− (15− 8γ)fi + 2γf−i
15D(1− γ) .
(36)
Replacing these expressions in demand functions and solving the maximization in
t = 1 of the following profit function
Π(fi, r∗A, r∗B) = Di(fi, r∗A, r∗B)(fi + a− ci +D(r∗i − cc)). (37)
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This profit function is strictly decreasing on per-transaction fees, therefore a candi-
date equilibrium is the largest interest rate and the corresponding per-transaction
fee, that is
f∗i =
C +D(1− γ)(r + 2cc)− 2(1− γ)(a− ci)− 3D(1− γ)r
(3− 2γ) , (38)
and r∗A = r∗B = r. However, even if firms can’t keep increasing interest rates
(because they would loose all sophisticated consumers), they still have incentives
to lower per-transaction fees. This will happen until the following equilibrium
condition hold, for any positive ∆
Π(fi∗, r) ≥ Π(fi∗ −∆, r), (39)
which means that per-transaction fees are given by
f∗i =
t(M +K) + f0 − 2(a− ci)− 2D(r − cc)
3 (40)
At this value for per-transaction fees, firms have no incentives to deviate either
setting slightly higher or lower per-transaction fees.
Now, in t = 2 assume you are in the low interest rate equilibrium. Firms are
playing best responses to per-transaction fees, but they can still deviate to a high
interest rate. They won’t do so if and only if
γ ≤ r − cc
r − cc
. (41)
By the same argument as in the single-homing case. Note that for any given per-
transaction fees charged by firms in the first period, this condition makes setting
a low interest rate a dominant strategy.
Now, assume the high interest rate equilibrium holds. Firms won’t deviate to
r if and only if
γ ≥ r − cc
r − cc
. (42)
However, now firms can deviate to even lower interest rates because, in contrast
with the single homing case, they can obtain more demand by lowering interest
rates. Suppose the firm deviates and ∆ less than r in t = 2. The profits of sticking
to the Nash equilibrium strategies and deviating are given by
(f∗i + a− ci)Di(f∗i , r) + γD(r − cc)Di(f∗i , r) (43)
(f∗i + a− ci)Di(f∗i , r −∆) + γD(r − cc)Di(f∗i , r −∆). (44)
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The deviating profits are higher than the Nash equilibrium profits if and only if
0 ≥ (3− 2γ)D(r − r), (45)
which can never hold, so this deviation is not profitable, if r > r.
Finally, note that deviations in t = 1 and in t = 2 by some firm can’t occur
in any of both equilibriums because, given any per-transaction fees charged in the
first period, the equilibrium condition for γ defines the interest rate charged in
the second period and charging this interest rate will be a dominating strategy
for each firm. Therefore, firms won’t have incentives to deviate in the first period
either.
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We analyze the impact of platform price parity clauses when sellers set
final prices and platforms set fixed fees. In this environment, platforms of-
ten rely on different tools to affect the degree of competition between sellers
and influence final prices charged to consumers. We develop a model in
which platforms can decide the unitary search cost faced by consumers, and
show when it is profitable for platforms to obfuscate consumers through high
search costs. Then, we show that price parity clauses, when exogenously
given, can reduce or increase prices and consumer surplus. Even though
platforms’ demands become independent of prices, price parity clauses make
the equilibrium price set by sellers less responsive to the search cost. Finally,
when price parity clauses are endogenous, we show that in the unique equi-
librium, platforms set price parity clauses if and only if they lead to higher
obfuscation, prices, and lower consumer welfare.
Keywords: price parity rules, consumer obfuscation, platforms.
JEL Classifications: D18, D83, L81.
1. Introduction
Platform price parity clauses (PPCs) restrict sellers joining a platform not to
charge a lower price on their alternative distribution channels. In this article, we
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propose a mechanism under which PPCs can increase or decrease final prices and
consumer welfare. As platforms are adopting the agency model, in which the final
prices of the goods are set by the sellers, platforms often rely on complementary
tools to influence the degree of competition between sellers to affect the final price
charged to consumers. Then, they extract sellers’ profits through different kinds
of fees. We show that PPCs reduce the ability of a platform to influence the final
prices set by sellers, as these clauses make sellers internalize that a price increase
must also occur on their other distribution channels. This “reduced pass-through”
effect reduces the incentives of platforms to increase prices through these com-
plementary tools. In contrast, these clauses have been argued to reduce platform
competition, leading to platforms setting higher fees, and therefore, sellers charg-
ing higher prices to consumers. Which effect dominates critically depends on the
shape of the demand function faced by both sellers and platforms.
These clauses are widely used by several platforms, such as Amazon, Book-
ing.com, Expedia, or Apple on its e-books market and have been contested by
Antitrust authorities around the world. Some of the main antitrust investiga-
tions include Expedia and Booking.com1, Amazon2 and Apple’s e-books market.3
These clauses have been argued to reduce competition between platforms, while the
defendants argue that these restrictions prevent showrooming, where consumers
search in a platform and then buy directly from the seller (or another platform)
at a lower price. We contribute to this discussion by showing that, even in the
absence of showrooming arguments, PPCs might lead to lower prices and higher
consumer surplus.
Our analysis is based on the fact that many online platforms rely on alterna-
tive tools to shape competition between sellers, and have stopped using traditional
instruments such as linear fees. Linear fees used to provide a simple tool to af-
fect prices set by sellers, but have lost popularity among platforms for different
reasons.4 Some examples of alternative tools used by platforms to influence com-
petition between sellers and extract profits include: the auctioning of prominent
positions in the platform’s search engine,5 advertising products on their websites,
1In 2015, several European authorities lead to Expedia and Booking removing their wide
PPCs. For more details see Wright and Wang (2018).
2Amazon removed these clauses in Europe after Antitrust investigations in the U.K. and
Germany.
3The U.S. Department of Justice contested Apple’s switch to the agency model in conjunction
with PPCs after Apple entered the e-books market in 2010. For more details see Foros, Kind
and Shaffer (2017) for more details.
4See Johnson (2017) and Wang and Wright (2017) for some explanations on why linear fees
are no longer used by online platforms.
5See Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
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or selling their own products while competing with independent sellers,6 among
others. We focus on platforms’ incentives to obfuscate consumers by increasing
their search cost when sampling sellers in the platform.
While obfuscation practices by firms have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature, the reasons why platforms acting as marketplaces would obfuscate are less
clear. We argue that platforms may use obfuscation in order to reduce competi-
tion between sellers, and then extracting sellers’ profits through complementary
fees, such as fixed or ad-valorem fees. One of the main examples of obfuscating
practices observed online is the use of partitioned and drip pricing,7 where the
total price is divided into several subcategories, including shipping fees, handling
fees, or credit card surcharges, among others. Huck and Wallace (2015) show,
through experimental evidence, that the way prices are showed or “framed” may
have detrimental effects on consumers’ search process. In this experiment, just
by adding two clicks to find out the total price of the product, consumers end up
paying higher prices while their consumer surplus is reduced by 22%.8 Another
relevant example of drip pricing, that has brought the attention of the regulators
in the United States is the use of "resort fees" by hotels, especially when posting
their rooms in online travel agents. These are per-room and per-night mandatory
fees charged by some hotels and are usually disclosed separately from the room
rate. An analysis from the Federal Trade Commission finds that these separate re-
sort fees are “likely to harm consumers by increasing the search costs and cognitive
costs of finding and choosing hotel accommodations”.9
To investigate these issues, we develop a stylized model that matches the fea-
tures of many online markets. We focus on an equilibrium where a large number
of sellers join two horizontally differentiated platforms, while consumers join and
search only from their preferred platform. This kind of “bottleneck” equilibrium is
representative of many of these markets. We assume that consumers incur in costly
search to learn both the price and their valuation for a product, and make optimal
6For example, Amazon is known to sell its own products in competition with independent
sellers.
7Drip pricing is a particular case of partitioned prices where the different categories composing
the price are showed after in the search process.
8There is an extensive body of empirical research reaching similar results. For example,
Hossain and Morgan (2006) use data from eBay and show that increasing the shipping fee relative
to the base price, increases the number of bidders and the revenue for firms selling through this
website. Also, Brown et al. (2010) make a field experiment using the Yahoo Taiwan and the
eBay Ireland platforms, and find that increasing shipping fees can boost revenues if these fees
are shrouded. An interesting example is the case of taxes that are sometimes shown separately
and later on in the purchasing process. Chetty et al. (2009) show, while studying the salience
of taxes in a supermarket, that taxes included in posted prices have more significant effects on
consumer demand than the ones added at the register in the end. Greenleaf et al. (2016) provide
a survey of this literature.
9See "Economic analysis of hotel resort fees" by Mary Sullivan from the Federal Trade Com-
mission, January 2017. Quote from Executive Summary p.V.
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decisions relative to which platform to join. Sellers are horizontally differentiated
and compete in prices. Platforms design a search environment for consumers and
sellers to interact, defined by the unitary search cost faced by consumers when
sampling sellers. For simplicity, we assume that platforms choose a single level of
search cost in the model. Platforms also charge a fixed fee to sellers.
Our first contribution is to show that, in the absence of PPCS, when competi-
tion between platforms is not too intense, there will be obfuscation in equilibrium,
interpreted as search costs in equilibrium being higher than a minimum exogenous
level. The intuition is that when platforms increase their search cost, they reduce
price competition between sellers, because consumers, on average, sample fewer
firms. Therefore, the equilibrium price set by sellers increase. This reduces plat-
forms’ demands due to: the higher equilibrium price and consumers finding, on
average, worse products, due to the higher search costs. If platform differentiation
is not too small, the equilibrium involves obfuscation.
Our second contribution is to analyze the impact of PPCs. We start by show-
ing that, when these clauses are exogenously imposed, the level of obfuscation and
prices may decrease. The intuition is that PPCs affect platforms’ incentives to ob-
fuscate in two opposite ways. First, when PPCs are imposed, platforms’ demands
stop depending on prices, as consumers expect the same price in both platforms,
increasing platforms’ incentives to obfuscate to increase the price set by sellers.
Second, PPCs reduce the pass-through rate from search costs to final prices, as
sellers facing an increase in the search cost by a given platform, now internalize
that increasing their price also means increasing it in the rival platform. Therefore,
the price increase or a marginal increment in the search cost of a given platform is
lower, decreasing its incentives to obfuscate. We show that which effect dominates
depends on the curvature of the distribution of match values, understood as the
curvature of the Mills ratio of the match values distribution around the symmetric
equilibrium.
Then, we extend the model, and we allow platforms to choose whether to
impose PPCs or not as an endogenous variable. We show that these clauses are
imposed if it is individually profitable for each platform to do so. Therefore, in the
unique equilibrium of the game, if price parity clauses are set by both platforms,
equilibrium prices are higher, consumer surplus is lower, and platforms profits
increase, relative to the case with no PPCs. On the contrary, if PPCs are not set




This work is directly related to the platform price parity clauses literature. Wang
and Wright (2018) focus on an environment where consumers can search for prod-
ucts sold through platforms or directly trough the sellers’ direct channel. Price
parity clauses in this context would prevent consumers from searching in a plat-
form and then switching to buy directly in a seller’s direct channel at a lower price.
They analyze two types of PPCs. First, narrow PPCs, where sellers are cannot
charge lower prices in their direct channel. Second, wide PPCs, where sellers can-
not charge lower prices in any other channel. In this setting, when a monopoly
platform exists, PPCs lead to higher prices and lower consumer surplus. When
there are competing platforms, a narrow PPC might be good for consumers as
long as platform competition is sufficiently intense.
Johansen and Vergé (2017) also model a case with platform competition and
a direct channel. In their model, wide PPCs can be better for all participants,
depending on the level of differentiation between goods and between platforms.
Boik and Corts (2016), on their part, find that prices are always higher under
PPCs, but it might be that this effect is so strong, that even platforms are worse
in equilibrium. Edelman and Wright also develop a model in which sellers can sell
in their direct channel, and PPCs prevent showrooming by increasing the price if
this channel. Platforms over-invest in ancillary services when PPCs are in place,
and consumer surplus is lower.
Calzada, Manna, and Mantovani (2019) focus on the online travel agents mar-
ket and analyze segmentation issues, where hotels can choose to delist from a
platform and sell directly through their own channels. In their model, online
travel agents set PPCs when showrooming is intense or when substitutability be-
tween them is high. When PPCs are set, hotels choose to single-home and sell
their products only in one online travel agent. The main difference between these
papers and ours is that we focus on a setting with no direct channel but with
ad-valorem fees instead of linear fees and that in our model, platforms indirectly
affect competition through an additional competitive variable.
Johnson (2017) and Foros, Jarle Kind, and Shaffer (2017) study the impact
of PPCs in the decision of upstream and downstream firms to adopt the agency
model, where suppliers instead of retailers set final prices, and the revenues are
split according to an ad-valorem fee. While their focus is mainly related to the
effects of the agency model on final prices and welfare relative to the traditional
wholesale model and to when this model is adopted, we take as given that platforms
use the agency model and set the ad-valorem fees and focus on the effect of PPCs
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when platforms use alternative tools to control the final price charged by sellers
indirectly. Therefore, we consider all this literature complementary to our work.
This article is also related to the literature of obfuscation, in particular, related
to obfuscation practices by intermediaries. Hagiu and Jullien (2011, 2014) study
the incentives o an information intermediary, that collects per-click fees, to divert
search. The intermediary has superior information about that match between a
consumer and a firm, and they derive conditions under which the intermediary
guides the consumer to search their less preferred firm first. Eliaz and Spiegler
(2011) explain how a search engine chooses a pool of sellers to show when a con-
sumer submits a query and is also paid on a per-click basis. They also find that it
may be optimal for the engine to contaminate the search pool with non-relevant
firms for consumers. Teh and Wright (2018) also consider a case where an in-
termediary has higher information on the match between consumers and firms,
but its revenue comes from sellers paying a commission conditional on consumers
making a purchase. The intermediary provides a ranking of firms for consumers.
In equilibrium, even if the recommendation is not distorted, competition between
sellers to offer higher commissions to the intermediary increase final prices, and
consumer surplus is lower. Other papers focusing on obfuscation by intermedi-
aries that give recommendations to consumers are Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a,
2012b), Murooka (2015), and de Cornière and Taylor (2016). Our work extends
and complements this literature by showing how obfuscation, through increased
search costs, might be optimal in an environment where platforms set ad-valorem
fees and sellers set final prices.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model and its main assumptions. In Section 3, we analyze the platforms’ ob-
fuscation game, when PPCs are not imposed. Then, in section 4, we analyze
the platforms’ game when PPCs are exogenously imposed, and when PPCs are a
decision variable for each platform. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2. The model
A continuum of consumers has unit demand for a single good produced at zero
marginal cost by a continuum of sellers (firms). We normalize the measures of both
consumers and sellers to one. Consumers can only interact with sellers through
one of two competing platforms acting as marketplaces, called A and B. The
value of a seller’s product is idiosyncratic to consumers, and they must engage
in costly search to learn both the match value and the price of a given seller.
The surplus of buying from seller j, net of search costs, is εij − pjk, where εij
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is the idiosyncratic match utility of consumer i derived from firm j (the same in
both platforms) and pjk is the price of firm j on platform k. We assume that the
distribution of εij is independent across consumers and firms and has a smooth,
positive everywhere and log-concave density function g on the interval [0, v], with
cumulative distribution function G.
Consumers also have a heterogeneous fixed cost of joining each platform de-
noted by tA and tB . We assume that half of consumers have tA = 0 and tB
distributed uniformly on [0, t], while the other half has tB = 0 and tA following
the same distribution. This assumption represents a situation where half of the
consumers are already familiar with one of the platforms and must face a fixed cost
if they decide to join the other platform and vice versa. Therefore, the parameter
t is a measure of platform differentiation or market power, because a higher value
of t makes consumers, on average, more reluctant to visit one of the platforms.10
Consumers’ outside option to both platforms is 0.
Platforms mediate transactions at zero cost. Platform k ∈ {A,B} charges a
publicly displayed fixed fee τk to all sellers. The platforms also design a search
environment characterized by the unitary search cost sk faced by consumers when
sampling sellers in their marketplace. There is a minimum exogenous search cost
s that can be set by the platforms, meaning that even if they create the simplest
search environment possible, consumers must still incur a small cost to sample
each firm.11 We define obfuscation as the equilibrium search cost set by both
platforms being higher than s. Finally, platforms set no fees to consumers.
Sellers compete in prices and decide whether to participate in one or both
platforms after observing the fixed fee τk, and the unitary search costs sk set by A
and B. The search process for consumers is assumed to have perfect recall and no
replacement. Consumers observe the search cost of each platform before making
their participation decision and have rational expectations on equilibrium prices
and sellers’ participation decisions.12 We assume the search process is random,
meaning there is no particular order in which consumers sample sellers. Consumers
hold passive beliefs about equilibrium prices when observing a price deviation from
10This specification allows us to derive Hotelling-like demands for platforms and focus on
platform competition in an equilibrium where all consumers participate in the market, without
the technical complications of adding an extensive margin decision when platforms choose their
strategic variables. See Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest (2017) for a search model
with heterogeneous search costs where both the intensive and extensive margin play a role in
market outcomes.
11The model could be solved ignoring this assumption. The main insights would not be affected.
This assumption helps to make exposition simpler by ignoring the case where search costs are
negligible, and the model becomes the one studied by Perloff and Salop (1985).
12If consumers would anticipate instead of observing the search costs, then platforms would
deviate by increasing the search costs once consumers have joined their marketplace, leading to
a Diamond paradox like equilibrium with maximum search costs.
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the equilibrium path.13
The timing of the game is as follows: at stage 1, platforms simultaneously
design their search environment by choosing sk. At stage 2, they set their fixed fee
τk after observing the search design of their rival. At stage 3, firms decide which
platform to join and simultaneously set prices, possibly different, in each of them.
Finally, at stage 4, consumers decide which platform to join and search randomly
for their preferred product.
We focus on a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which platforms set
symmetric fixed fees and obfuscation levels, sellers join both platforms and con-
sumers search and buy in only one, usually referred to as a bottleneck equilibrium.
2.1. Discussion of modeling assumptions
Our model tries to capture the fact that platforms create search environments,
where it can be easier or harder for consumers to search. While part of the liter-
ature focuses on the composition of the pool of firms shown to consumers after a
query, or the ordering of such firms,14 we focus on the unitary search cost, inter-
preted as how difficult is to learn the relevant information of a particular product.
For example, which features of the product are immediately shown and which
features are discovered after a few clicks. Such features include price, product
characteristics, shipping fees, etc. In practice, platforms give different options to
sellers, and they decide how to show their information within the framework that
the platform allows. For simplicity, we assume that the platform chooses a single
frame that must be followed by all firms.
Regarding platforms’ fee structure, we focus on a fixed fee aimed at extracting
sellers’ profits. In practice, many platforms have switched to a business model
where they set ad-valorem fees, defined as a percentage of the price charged by
sellers. Our results would be unaffected under the assumption of an exogenous
ad-valorem fee instead of a fixed fee. For example, Apple uses a fixed ad-valorem
fee of 30% for all firms in every one of the markets they serve under the agency
model.15 Given that our main intuition comes from the fact that platforms are
13This means that observing a price deviation from a seller does not change the expectation
prices charged by unsampled sellers. We also assume that the search process has perfect recall,
meaning that consumers can come back at any time to buy from a previously sampled firm.
14See, for example, Athey and Ellison (2011), Eliaz and Spiegler (2011), Chen and He (2011),
Chen and Zhang (2017), among others.
15Even when considering an endogenous ad-valorem fee, it is generally the case that platforms
increase such fees to extract most profits from sellers, maintaining our main intuitions. From
a technical perspective, when price parity clauses are imposed, such fees generate the unreal-
istic deviation from equilibrium in which a platform reduces the equilibrium price in the other
platform, therefore sellers do not join, and that platform becomes inactive.
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not using linear fees,16 and, therefore, must rely on other variables to affect price
competition and equilibrium prices, assuming a fixed fee simplifies the analysis
without losing important features of these markets.
With respect to the equilibrium concept, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium
where both platforms are active while sellers multi-home and consumers single-
home. If consumers single-home, firms have incentives to join both platforms to
access as many consumers as possible, as long as they cover their fixed costs. This
kind of competitive bottleneck equilibrium, where the side that faces differentiation
(consumers) single-homes and the side that considers platforms as homogeneous
(sellers) multi-homes, naturally arises in this kind of setting, as discussed by Arm-
strong and Wright (2007). Also, there are less interesting equilibria where only one
or none platform is active because consumers expect no firms to join, and firms
do not join because they expect no consumer to participate.
Finally, we assume that consumers search randomly among the firms in a given
platform. Even if in reality firms are usually ordered, and this order influences con-
sumers’ search behavior, the central intuition where a higher search cost reduces
competition between sellers and therefore increases equilibrium prices, stays un-
changed.17 Hence, assuming that firms are ordered would not affect the qualitative
results of our model.
2.2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recapitulate some known results from the search litera-
ture that are instrumental in understanding the analysis that follows.18
Consumers’ behavior : consumers’ behavior is characterized by whether to
participate in the market or not, and which platform to use, along with their search
and purchasing behavior once they are in a platform.
Once on a platform, as is known from Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Weitzman
(1979), consumer optimal search is characterized by a stationary stopping rule,
based on a constant reservation value that we denote a, that depends on the
16There are several explanations on why platforms are migrating to the agency model with
ad-valorem fees. For example, Wang and Wright (2017, 2018) show that these fees are used to
achieve efficient price discrimination when platforms sell different goods with different costs and
valuations by consumers.
17textFor example, Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) show that in a model where a firm is
prominent, and therefore sampled first by every consumer, equilibrium prices of every firm are
still increasing in the search cost of consumers.
18The derivation of all of the following results are found in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and
Renault (1999).
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search cost. This reservation value a is given by the unique solution to∫ v
a
(x− a)dG(x) = s. (1)
When consumers are in a platform, they start sampling firms randomly and sup-
pose all the firms join each platform. Every time they sample a firm, say firm j, it
is optimal for them to stop and purchase that good if εij − pj > a− p∗, where p∗
is the expected equilibrium price of the other firms. If they purchase the product,
they leave the market. If not, they go on and sample the next firm and follow the
same decision rule. Therefore, equation (1) derives the reservation value such that
the incremental benefit of one additional search is equal to the search cost. Given
that there is a continuum of firms in each platform, consumers never return and
buy from a previously sampled firm and never switch platforms.
Before joining either platform, consumers must decide whether to participate in
the market and which platform to join. The expected consumer surplus of joining








− sk1−G(ak)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected search cost
− p∗k(sk)− tk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected price and fixed cost
. (2)
This expression is derived as follows. Given that there is a continuum of firms
in the platform, consumers eventually find a suitable product. Therefore, their
expected match value is given by E[ε|ε ≥ a]. With respect to the expected search
costs, in a symmetric price equilibrium, a consumer stops and buys in a given firm
with probability 1−G(ak), and keeps searching with probability G(ak). Therefore,
the expected search cost is given by
∑∞
l=0 G
l(ak)s = s1−G(ak) .
After some manipulations, we can rewrite (2) as:19
φk = ak(sk)− p∗k(sk)− tk, (3)
where we observe that the expected match value and the expected search cost sim-
plify to ak. Consumers join the platform yielding the highest expected consumer
surplus based on the observed search cost, expected prices, and idiosyncratic fixed
cost, as long as this value is non-negative.
Firms’ pricing: for a given level of aA and aB , denote DA and DB as the
demands of platforms A and B, respectively. As all sellers join both platforms,
the expected number of consumers searching a given seller in platform k is Dk,
19Integrating by parts the first term and using (1) on both terms to derive an expression only
as a function of ak.
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given that the number of buyers and sellers are normalized to 1. In a symmetric
price equilibrium between sellers, the probability of a consumer buying in any
given seller when it is sampled is 1 − G(a). Therefore, the expected number of
consumers sampling any seller in their second round isG(a)Dk, in their third round
is G2(a)Dk, and so son. Now, suppose seller j deviates from the equilibrium. A
consumer buys from firm j if and only if eij − pj ≥ a − p∗k, where p∗k is the




[Gl(a)][1−G(pjk + a− p∗k)]Dk =
1−G(pjk + ak − p∗k)
1−G(a) Dk. (4)
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, each seller’s demand is equal to Dk. As
consumers join platforms based on expected prices, the value of Dk is fixed for sell-
ers, and they only compete for consumers that have decided to join that platform.
The profit function of firm j is given by
Πj = ΠjA + ΠjB , (5)
where, for k ∈ {A,B},
Πjk = pjk
[1−G(pjk + ak − p∗k)]
1−G(ak)
Dk − τk. (6)
The prices every firm sets in each platform are independent of each other,
as the price set in one platform does not affect a given seller’s demand on the
other platform. Therefore, taking the first-order conditions for a symmetric price





This is the unique symmetric price equilibrium of the sellers’ pricing stage for a
given ak, under the assumption that g is log-concave.
We define λ(a) ≡ 1−G(a)g(a) as the Mills ratio of the distribution g. Therefore,
the equilibrium price is equal to the Mills ratio of the distribution. Given that g
is log-concave, the equilibrium price is decreasing in ak or, equivalently, increasing
in sk. Also, λ′(a) represents the pass-trough rate of an infinitesimal change on the
reservation value ak to the equilibrium price.
Given that sellers cannot affect the share of consumers participating in a given
platform and given that the equilibrium price in a platform is independent of the
strategic variables set by the rival platform, sellers will participate in each platform
as long as they make non-negative in each platform.
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3. Consumer obfuscation
In this section, we characterize the symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
game, focusing on a bottleneck equilibrium in which sellers join both platforms
and consumers search and buy in only one platform. We explain why and when
platforms obfuscate in equilibrium, meaning that they design a search environment
with a unitary search cost higher than the minimum exogenous level s.
To begin the analysis, we highlight the relationship between the search cost sk
set by a platform k, and the corresponding reservation value ak associated with
that value of the search cost. A higher search cost implies a lower reservation value
and leads to a higher equilibrium price. This leads to a consumers’ optimal search
rule associated with consumers searching less, and therefore, finding, on average,
lower match values. Thus, their expected consumer surplus is lower. For technical
simplicity, we take advantage of this one-to-one inverse relationship between search
costs and reservation values, and from now on, we characterize the stage 1 of the
game as the platforms’ choice of reservation values.
Now, we describe the feasible set for reservation values for both platforms.
Define a as the unique value of a such that a = λ(a).20 Given the expression for
expected consumer surplus, φ(ak) = ak−λk(ak)−tk, and given that ak−λk(ak) is
strictly increasing in ak, any ak lower than a would leave consumers with negative
expected consumer surplus, even if their fixed cost is 0. Therefore, platforms will
never set a reservation value ak < a. Also, the minimum search cost s generates
a maximum possible reservation value a, given by equation (1) evaluated at s.
Hence, platforms’ feasible set for reservation values is [a, a].21
To ensure the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric bottleneck equilib-
rium, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The Mills ratio λ(a) is log-concave, meaning that λ(a)λ′′(a)−
λ′2(a) ≤ 0, ∀a ∈ [a, a].
This assumption means that the Mills ratio is not “too convex” in the relevant
support for the platforms choice. This assumption is satisfied by any distribu-
tion with constant curvature, such as the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD).
It also holds the Power Function distribution and some parametrizations of the
Beta distribution. Moreover, we provide a result in the Appendix (see Lemma 3),
showing that right-hand truncations of log-concave distribution functions generate
log-concave Mills ratios, as long as the truncation point is not too high, therefore
satisfying assumption 1.
20It is unique due to the log-concavity of the distribution of match values.
21This set is non-empty as long as the value of s is not too high.
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To derive platforms’ demands, note that consumers expect the continuum of
firms to be active in each platform, so they rationally anticipate that joining a
platform will lead to a purchase with probability 1 in that platform. Therefore,
they will join platform A, rather than platform B, if and only if φA(aA) ≥ φB(aB)
or, equivalently, if (aA − p∗A − tA ≥ aB − p∗B − tB). Consider the case where
aA ≥ aB . Then, all consumers that have tA = 0 go to platform A. Consumers




Consumers with tA = 0
+ 12 Pr(tA ≤ aA − aB + p
∗
B − p∗A))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumers with tB = 0
, (8)








We obtain the same expression for DA when aB > aA. Therefore, DA is given by
expression (9). The demand for platform B is derived following the same steps.
The reservation value aA has two effects on demand. First, a traditional price
effect, where a lower reservation value increase the equilibrium price, and therefore,
reducing consumers expected consumer surplus. Second, an effect on consumers’
optimal search rule, where lower reservation value increases the expected match
value net of search costs they obtain in the search process.
Platform k extracts all profits from sellers joining that platform, by setting a
fixed fee τk = p∗kDk at t=2. Therefore, t = 1, the maximization problem of a given
platform, say A, is given by
max
aA
ΠA(aA, τA) = p∗A(aA)DA(aA). (10)
The maximization problem of platform B is analogous. The first-order condition
for platform A with respect to the reservation value aA is given by
λ′(aA)DA(aA) +
(1− λ′(aA))
2t λ(aA) = 0, (11)
and similarly for platform B. In a symmetric equilibrium of the obfuscation game
between platforms, we have
λ(a∗) = − tλ
′(a∗)
(1− λ′(a∗)) . (12)
The following proposition characterizes the unique symmetric bottleneck equilib-
rium of the game:
Proposition 1. Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then, for any t > 0, there exists
a unique symmetric bottleneck equilibrium. Sellers multi-home and make zero
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profits in each platform, and consumers always search and buy from their preferred
platform. Moreover, there exist values t and t such that the equilibrium reservation
value (search cost) is as follows
• If t ≤ t, then a∗ = a.
• If t < t < t, then a∗ ∈ [a, a], given by the solution of (12).
• If t < t, then a∗ = a.
The equilibrium reservation value is non-increasing in t, and the equilibrium
search cost is non-decreasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows how obfuscation can be a useful tool to increase prices and
profits for platforms. The main economic trade-off highlighted by proposition 1 is
as follows. If a platform decreases its reservation value, or equivalently, increases
its search cost, competition between sellers is reduced, and the equilibrium price
increases. The cost of doing so is a loss of demand due to this higher price and also
due to a lower expected consumer surplus because of lower match values. When
differentiation between platforms is high enough, the equilibrium reservation value
is lower than a, and the equilibrium search cost is higher than s, result that we
interpret as obfuscation.
In the symmetric bottleneck equilibrium described in Proposition 1, all con-
sumers join the platform where they face zero fixed cost. Therefore, consumer
welfare is proportional to the equilibrium reservation value (inversely proportional
to the equilibrium search cost) as a higher reservation value lowers the equilib-
rium price and increases the match value that consumers obtain on average. This
means that increased competition between platforms increases consumer surplus.
Platforms profits, on the contrary, decrease if t is lower, while sellers are always
fully extracted.
In our model, the platform sets a unique search cost that consumers face when
searching for products. In reality, platforms implement this by allowing their sell-
ers to use different forms of obfuscation, such as using drip pricing or concealing
relevant information to consumers. This forces consumers to click several times
on a product to find out all the relevant information before purchasing, increasing
their search cost. In doing so, consumers search, on average, fewer firms, soften-
ing competition between sellers, and increasing the prices they charge. Finally,
platforms extract these profits through fixed fees.
A relevant example of such obfuscation behavior is the use of “resort fees” when
hotels post their offers in online travel agents (OTAs). These mandatory per-night
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fees charged by some hotels are often concealed from consumers when searching for
hotel rooms and are showed at late stages of the purchasing process. This behavior
brought the attention of the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, that
concluded that this conduct “is likely to harm consumers by increasing the search
costs and cognitive costs of finding and choosing hotel accommodations”.22 Even
if hotels are setting the resort fees, OTAs design the search environment where it
is possible for the hotels to obfuscate through the use of such fees. We interpret
this as OTAs obfuscating consumers.
This result also highlights that increased platform competition in our model
always leads to lower obfuscation and equilibrium prices. Whether competition is
enough to solve obfuscation practices has been a relevant question in the literature.
While Hagiu and Jullien (2014) also find that platform competition reduces obfus-
cation practices, other articles find opposite results. For example, de Cornière and
Taylor (2016) find that competition between biased intermediaries might lead to
the same outcome as in a case with a monopolist because all consumers use only
one of the intermediaries in equilibrium.23
Finally, we explain the effect of the curvature of the match value distribution
in our result. For this purpose, we provide an example by assuming that the dis-
tribution of match values follows a Generalized Pareto Distribution with a density
function given by g(x, ξ) = (1+ξx)−(1+ξ)/ξ and a cumulative distribution function
given by G(x, ξ) = 1 − (1 + ξx)−1/ξ. This distribution has the characteristic of
having a linear Mills ratio given by λ(x, ξ) = 1 + ξx. We assume that ξ < 0,
implying the Mills ratio is strictly decreasing in x.
Example 1. If the distribution of match values follows a GPD with paramter
ξ < 0, we can analytically solve for the equilibrium reservation value, given by:24
a∗ = ξ(1− t)− 1
ξ(1− ξ) . (13)
We observe that the equilibrium reservation value is decreasing in t and increasing
in ξ in the interval [a, a]. The intuition is that if the curvature of the Mills ratio,
given by the value of ξ, becomes smaller in absolute value, the price equilibrium
in the sellers’ stage is less responsive to changes in reservation values by plat-
forms. This lower pass-through from search costs to the equilibrium prices set by
22See “Economic analysis of hotel resort fees” by Mary Sullivan, Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission 2017.
23This result is often found in the literature on obfuscation by individual firms. For example,
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) find that competition will not eliminate shrouding of attributes by
firms, and in Ellison and Wolitsky (2012) the levels of obfuscation might increase in the number
of firms.
24The conditions of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium hold as for the GPD λ′′ = 0 and
therefore assumption 1 holds for any ξ < 0.
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sellers decreases the incentives of platforms to induce higher prices through lower
reservation values (through higher obfuscation).
For distributions without a constant Mills ratio, how the curvature of demand
affects the equilibrium depends on the shape of the distribution around the sym-
metric equilibrium, which in turn depends on the value of t. In the next section,
we study this issue when comparing the result of Proposition 1 with a case where
price parity clauses are set by the platforms.
4. Price parity clauses
In this section, we analyze the effects of price parity clauses on the level of search
costs and equilibrium prices. We focus on “wide” price parity clauses, where sellers
joining a platform that imposes such a clause cannot charge a lower price in the
other platform. We start by characterizing the case where price parity clauses are
exogenously imposed in both platforms, to understand their effects on consumer
behavior, sellers’ pricing, and platforms’ obfuscation strategies. Then, we extend
the model to allow platforms to decide whether to impose such clauses or not,
allowing us to understand platforms’ incentives to impose those restrictions.
Exogenous price parity clauses: suppose first that PPCs are exogenously
imposed by both platforms. Therefore, as we continue to focus on a symmetric
bottleneck equilibrium, sellers set a uniform price. We show that PPCs influence
platforms’ search design decisions through two effects. First, a demand effect,
given by the fact that consumers expect the same price in both platforms. There-
fore, platforms’ demands become less elastic to changes in their reservation values
(search costs), as platforms’ demands become independent of equilibrium prices.
This effect decreases the level of competition between platforms and increases
platforms’ incentives to implement higher equilibrium prices through higher ob-
fuscation. Second, a pass-through effect, where the sensibility of the equilibrium
price with respect to the reservation values is lower. This reduces platforms’ in-
centives to increase prices through obfuscation. We show how the shape of the
distribution of match values is critical to determine which effect dominates. In
equilibrium, PPCs may lead to higher or lower obfuscation and prices.
To understand the demand effect, note that consumers’ participation decision
and search behavior once they join a platform is the same as in the previous section.
The only difference is that they expect the same price on both platforms. Thus,







The demand for platform B is derived analogously. Platforms’ demands become
less elastic to changes in reservation values, as they are now independent of the
uniform equilibrium price. This reduces platform competition when designing their
search environment, increasing their incentives to obfuscate.




1−G(aA + pj − p∗p)
1−G(aA)
+DB
1−G(aB + pj − p∗p)
1−G(aB)
]
− τA − τB , (15)
where p∗p is the symmetric price equilibrium in both platforms and pj is the uniform
price set by seller j. The profit function is the same as the one derived in section
2, but now sellers must charge the same price on both platforms. The following
result characterizes the unique equilibrium of the sellers sub-game at t = 3, for
given values of aA, aB , when price parity clauses are exogenously imposed on both
platforms:
Lemma 1. Suppose sellers join both platforms, and price parity clauses are ex-
ogenously imposed. Then, for given aA and aB, if s is not too small, the unique





in both platforms. The equilibrium price is increasing in aA and aB. Moreover, if






where p∗A and p∗B are the equilibrium prices in platforms A and B when PPCs are
not imposed. Finally, if aA = aB, we have
p∗A = p∗B = p∗p. (18)
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium price is a composition of the prices that would be set in each
platform in the absence of price parity clauses. This price now depends on the
reservation values set by both platforms. The reservation values’ effect on the
uniform equilibrium price is twofold. First, there is a composition effect, where a
platform setting a higher reservation value than its rival attracts more consumers,
and therefore, becomes more important for sellers. Second, we have a competition
effect, where a higher reservation value, equivalent to a lower search cost, increases
competition between sellers in that platform. Both effects go in the same direction
and imply that an increase in any of the reservation values decreases the equilib-
rium price. Note that Lemma 1 assumes that the exogenous minimum search
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cost is not too small. This assumption is needed to ensure that the sellers’ profit
functions are quasiconcave with respect to their own price.25
The equilibrium price in Lemma 1 allows us to understand how the pass-
through from reservation values to the equilibrium price is affected when PPCs
are in place. Around a symmetric equilibrium, we have
∂p∗p
ak
(aA = aB) =
λ′
2 , (19)
while in the case with no PPCs, the pass-through from reservation values to the
equilibrium price in a platform is λ′. This means that the pass-through rate
from reservation values to the equilibrium price is lower, meaning that a marginal
decrease in the reservation value of a platform, or, equivalently, a marginal increase
in the search cost of a platform, increases the price charged by sellers by a smaller
value than in the last section. Therefore, the incentives of platforms to increase
prices through higher obfuscation are lower.
The intuition for this reduced pass-through is that, when a platform decreases
its reservation value (or increases its search cost), sellers now internalize that if
they increase their price, they must also increase their price on the other platform.
Therefore, this price increase is lower, and the corresponding pass-through rate is
also lower.
Next, we characterize the platforms’ optimal strategies regarding their fixed
fees and search design. At t = 2, for a given aA and aB , platforms set their fixed
fees to attract sellers to participate while extracting all of their profits. Therefore,
the fixed fee is such that the participation constraint for sellers is binding in each
platform, given by τk = p∗pDk. Therefore, at t = 1, platform A maximizes
max
aA
ΠA(aA, aB) = p∗p(aA)DA(aA, aB), (20)





2t = 0. (21)




where a∗p is the symmetric equilibrium reservation value. The following result
compares the unique symmetric bottleneck equilibrium of the game when PPCs
are exogenously imposed in both platforms, with the case where PPCs are not
25For very asymmetric values of aA and aB , one platform becomes irrelevant for sellers as it
attracts only a few consumers, and profit functions for sellers may fail to be quasiconcave. To
avoid such a case, we assume that s is not too small, so that a is not too high and therefore the
profit functions are well behaved even for the extreme values of aA and aB given by a and a.
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enforced. It shows that, when the pass-through effect dominates, equilibrium
obfuscation and prices are lower when PPCs are imposed, and when the demand
effect dominates, obfuscation and prices are higher:
Proposition 2. Suppose assumption 1 holds and price parity clauses are exoge-
nously imposed by both platforms. Then, for any t > 0, there is a unique symmet-
ric bottleneck equilibrium. The equilibrium reservation value is non-increasing in t
and the equilibrium search cost is non-decreasing in t. Moreover, when comparing
interior solutions:
• If λ′(a∗p) < −1, the equilibrium reservation value and consumer surplus is
lower, while the equilibrium price and platform profits are higher under price
parity clauses.
• If λ′(a∗p) > −1, the equilibrium reservation value and consumer surplus is
higher, while the equilibrium price and platform profits are lower under price
parity clauses.
• If λ′(a∗p) = −1, the equilibrium reservation value, consumer surplus, equilib-
rium price and platform profits are the same as when no PPCs are imposed.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 2 is stated for interior solutions when comparing the
cases with and without PPCs. As the platforms always set reservation values
inside of the interval [a, a], and in both cases, reservation values decrease with
t, there exist values for t for which both cases lead to corner solutions and price
parity clauses do not make a difference in the market outcomes. From now on, we
focus on the comparison between interior solutions.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Consider the case where λ′(a∗p) >
−1. When decreasing the reservation value (increasing the search cost), the pass-
through rate of a given platform around a symmetric equilibrium goes from λ′ to
λ′




2t . The smaller λ
′(a∗p)
is in absolute value, meaning that λ′ is also very close to zero, implies that the
demand effect when no PPCs are in place is mainly explained by reduced match
values that consumers face and is barely explained by the price difference between
the platforms. Therefore, the demand effect when imposing PPCs is very small in
comparison to the case without PPCs. Hence, a value of λ′(a∗p) smaller than −1
in absolute value means that the pass-through effect is relatively more important
when comparing the case with no PPCs to the case with exogenous PPCs. This
implies lower obfuscation and prices when these clauses are in place. The opposite
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argument holds when λ′(a∗p) < −1. When λ′(a∗p) = −1, these two effects exactly
cancel, for any level of t, and PPCs don’t make a difference in prices, consumer
welfare, and platform profits.
Whether PPCs lead to higher or lower obfuscation and prices, depends on the
value of the pass-through from reservation values to equilibrium prices around the
symmetric equilibrium given by λ′(a∗p). A simple case is given by the Generalized
Pareto Distribution that has a constant Mills ratio, as in example 1. We use the
GPD to illustrate the result of Proposition 2:
Example 2. Suppose the distribution of match values follows a GPD with param-
eter ξ < 0. Thus, we can analytically solve for the equilibrium reservation value





while in the case with no PPCs, in Example 1, we obtained a∗ = ξ(1−t)−1ξ(1−ξ) . We
have that a∗ > a∗p if and only if
tξ(1 + ξ) > 0 (24)
which is equivalent to ξ < −1. As for the GPD λ′(a∗p) = ξ, the equilibrium
reservation value is lower, or equivalently, the equilibrium search cost and price
are higher under PPCs when ξ < −1, as stated in Proposition 2.
For other distributions, the value of λ′ depends on the shape of λ and on the
level of product differentiation t, as this parameter defines the equilibrium level of
the reservation value. When t increases, both the equilibrium reservation values
with and without PPCs decrease, while the equilibrium search costs and prices
increase. Therefore, how the parameter t influences the result of Proposition 2,
depends on the concavity or convexity of λ, as explained in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose assumption 1 holds, and that λ′(a1) > −1 and λ′(a2) < −1
for some values a1, a2 ∈ (a, a). Then:
• When λ is strictly concave, if t is high enough, PPCs leads to lower obfus-
cation and prices.




If λ′(a∗p) is always greater or smaller than −1, the result is always the one
explained in Proposition 2, as showed in Example 2. Therefore, this result focuses
on cases where both values are possible for different reservation values. In this
case, whether λ is concave or convex is critical to understand the effect of t in
the result. Suppose that λ is concave. Hence, λ decreases with a at an increasing
rate. As a higher t leads to a lower equilibrium reservation value a∗p, this implies a
greater value of λ(a∗p), where λ′(a∗p) is also higher (closer to 0) due to the concavity
of λ. Therefore, if t is high enough and λ is concave, we have λ′(a∗p) > −1 and
equilibrium obfuscation and prices are lower under PPCs.
In comparison with some of the literature, this result shows how price parity
clauses that restrict competition between platforms might lead to lower prices and
higher consumer surplus. Johansen and Vergé (2017) also find that clauses re-
stricting competition between platforms might benefit consumers when interbrand
competition is strong. In contrast, Boik and Corts (2016) find that PPCs always
lead to higher prices, while Wang and Wright (2018) find that wide PPCs allow
competing platforms to reach the same outcome as a monopolist, always hurting
consumers.
Endogenous price parity clauses: now, we endogenize the decision of set-
ting a PPC as a choice variable for both platforms in the first stage of the game.
We continue to focus on a symmetric bottleneck equilibrium. The timing of the
new game is as follows. At stage 1, platforms simultaneously design their search
environment by choosing sk and decide whether to impose a PPC. At stage 2,
they set their fixed fee τk after observing the search design and PPC choice of
their rival. At stage 3, firms decide which platform to join and set prices restricted
by the PPC (if any) set by platforms. Finally, at stage 4, consumers decide which
platform to join and search randomly for their preferred product.
Note that any asymmetric case, given by a platform setting PPCs and the
rival not setting such a clause, can be analyzed as the case with no PPCs from
Proposition 1 or the case with both platforms setting PPCs from Proposition 2.
Consider, for example, that aA > aB . In the absence of PPCs, the equilibrium
price in platform B would be higher than in platform A. Therefore, if B sets a PPC
and A does not, the PPC from platform B would be binding, and the resulting
game is the one described by Proposition 2. Thus, for the purpose of characterizing
the equilibrium, when aA > aB , it is equivalent that only the platform with a
higher price sets a PPC with both platforms setting PPCs.
We denote such a case as one with a binding PPC. If B does not set a PPC
and A does, this PPC is not binding, and sellers would set different prices in
each platform, as in Proposition 1. With this in consideration, we can derive the
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equilibrium of the endogenous game:
Proposition 3. Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then, for any t > 0:
• If λ′(a∗p) > −1, the unique symmetric bottleneck equilibrium is one with no
platform setting price parity clauses, and is described by Proposition 1.
• If λ′(a∗p) < −1, the unique symmetric bottleneck equilibrium is one with a
binding price parity clause, and is described by Proposition 2.
• If λ′(a∗p) = −1, both cases are an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Consider the first case where the
unique equilibrium is one with no platform setting PPCs. In the first stage, say
platform A, wants to deviate and set a PPC. If platform A increases its reservation
value, its price parity clause is not binding, and the game remains as described in
Proposition 1. But then, the initial reservation value that platform A was choosing
is the best response for that platform. Therefore, this deviation is never profitable.
On the contrary, if platform A decreases its reservation value with the objective
of increasing the price its sellers are charging, its PPC becomes binding, and the
game becomes as described by Proposition 2. This deviation can only be profitable
if price parity clauses lead to higher prices, or when λ′(a∗p) < −1. Therefore,
whenλ′(a∗p) > −1, both platforms not setting PPCs is the unique equilibrium.
Now, consider the equilibrium when price parity clauses are binding. For sim-
plicity, assume both platforms are initially setting a PPC. If a platform deviates
and stops imposing the clause, and it decreases the price charged by its sellers by
increasing the reservation value it sets, the PPC of the rival platform still binds,
and this cannot be a deviation. If it decreases the reservation value to increase the
price, the game becomes one with no price parity, and this deviation can only occur
when prices and profits are higher when no price parity clauses are set. Therefore,
we have that the unique equilibrium is individually profitable for each platform,
and its always related to higher prices and lower consumer surplus, despite if it
involves PPCs or not.
To conclude this section, we show that when PPCs are endogenously given,
they are only imposed when they lead to higher prices and lower consumer sur-
plus. Therefore, our analysis is consistent with the suspicions that PPCs might
hurt consumers. However, we also show that, when PPCs are exogenously given,
prices and obfuscation might go down, benefiting consumers. This case is still
useful for policymakers. For example, suppose that PPCs are mainly set to avoid
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showrooming from consumers. Then, our analysis would be relevant, meaning that
eliminating PPCs could cause prices to increase.
5. Conclusion
We developed a model in which two differentiated platforms attract buyers and
sellers to interact in their marketplace. As sellers choose final prices, and in the ab-
sence of linear fees, platforms must rely on alternative strategic variables to shape
competition between sellers. We showed how obfuscation, defined as increasing
unitary search costs of consumers, can be a useful tool for platforms to increase
prices charged by sellers and then extract these profits through a fixed fee. We
find that increased platform differentiation leads to higher obfuscation and higher
prices charged to consumers.
Then, we use this model to study the effect of price parity clauses on the level
of obfuscation and equilibrium prices. We show that, when price parity clauses
are exogenously imposed in both platforms, price parity clauses can increase or
decrease obfuscation and prices. Therefore, in some cases, these clauses may be
beneficial for consumers. However, when price parity clauses are endogenously
chosen by platforms, we find that the unique equilibrium involves price parity
clauses being set if and only if this leads to higher obfuscation and prices. This
confirms the traditional suspicions on these clauses.
Nevertheless, we raise two important factors that should be considered by reg-
ulators when analyzing price parity clauses. First, as platforms are switching to
the agency model, where sellers set final prices, platforms are relying on additional
tools to extract profits, such as obfuscation, auctions for prominent positions, ad-
vertising, among many others. We showed in the particular case of search design,
that PPCs influence the profitability of these practices for both platforms and sell-
ers, through a pass-through effect. Second, platforms normally sell many different
products, which are likely to have different shapes of demand. As our results sug-
gest, this shape is critical to determine the effects of PPCs, which is likely to be
very heterogeneous. Therefore, even when PPCs are set by a platform, forbidding
such clauses may cause an unexpected increase in prices in many products. The
same logic applies if a platform is setting PPCs mainly to avoid showrooming.
There are several alleys of research to understand both obfuscation by plat-
forms and price parity clauses. Regarding obfuscation, issues such as asymmetric
platforms, the existence of superstar firms, and prominence issues in consumer’s
search behavior are likely to influence obfuscation decisions by these platforms. In
relation to price parity clauses, we show how alternative strategic variables may
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be used by platforms to affect prices chosen by sellers. These clauses are likely to
affect both platforms’ and sellers’ behavior, as the effectiveness of these variables
is likely to be affected by these clauses. Further research on how these clauses
affect different strategies, such as auctioning positions in the platform, advertising
products, among others, is important to understand the effect of these restrictions
on widely used platforms such as Amazon, eBay, and Airbnb.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
We show that the platforms’ profit functions at t = 1 are quasiconcave in their
own reservation values and that, for a given t, the symmetric equilibrium value a∗
characterizes the unique bottleneck equilibrium of the game.
i) Quasiconcavity: the first-order condition for a given platform, say platform
A, is given by
λ′(aA)DA(aA, aB) +
(1− λ′(aA))
2t λ(aA) = 0. (25)
Due to the log-concavity assumption on the distribution of match values, we have
that λ′ < 0. We take the left-hand side of the first-order condition and divide it
by λ′(aA), obtaining the following function




If this function intersects 0 at most at a unique value of aA, the original first-order









[λ′2(aA)− λ′3(aA)− λλ′′(aA)], (27)
which is strictly greater than 0 due to Assumption 1. Therefore, ψ(aA, aB) is
strictly increasing in aA and must intersect 0 at most once. Therefore, the first-
order condition for profit maximization for platform A1 intersects 0 at most once.
This also means that if the first-order condition intersects 0, it must be from
positive to negative. This implies that the profit function is quasiconcave on its
own reservation value.






∗) = 0 (28)
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′2 − λ′3 − λλ′′], (30)
which is strictly greater than 0 due to Assumption 1. Therefore, the first-order
condition in a symmetric equilibrium intersect 0 at most once. In case the first
order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium intersect 0, it must be from positive
to negative, implying the equilibrium is unique.
Finally, we describe when the unique equilibrium is defined by the symmetric
first order-conditions for both platforms or by corner solutions. Define t such that
the first-order conditions at a symmetric equilibrium evaluated at a∗ = a are equal
to 0 and t such that the first order conditions at a symmetric equilibrium evaluated
at a∗ = a are equal to 0. We have that t < t from the fact that a∗ is decreasing in
t. Now, we have three cases:
Case i) t < t: in this case, each platform setting ak = a (or equivalently
sk = s) is the unique equilibrium at the platforms stage. If a given platform
would deviate by setting a lower reservation value, its first-order condition would
become positive, which cannot be a profitable deviation. Also, by technological
restrictions, platforms cannot set a higher ak. Therefore, the unique equilibrium
is characterized by platforms setting aA = aB = a.
Case ii) t < t < t: in this case, the equilibrium value of a∗ is given by the
unique solution of the symmetric first order-conditions.
Case iii) t < t: in this case, each platform setting ak = a (or equivalently
sk = s) is the unique equilibrium at the platforms stage. If a given platform
would deviate by setting a higher reservation value, its first-order condition would
become negative, which cannot be a profitable deviation. If a given platform would
deviate by setting a lower reservation value, no consumer would join the platform,
which cannot be a profitable deviation either. Therefore, the unique equilibrium
is characterized by platforms setting aA = aB = a.
Proof of lemma 1
The sellers maximize:
Πj = pj [κA(1−G(aA + pj − p∗p)) + κB(1−G(aB + pj − p∗p))]− τA − τB , (31)
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where κk = Dk1−G(ak) . DefineDj = [κA(1−G(aA+pj−p
∗
p))+κB(1−G(aB+pj−p∗p))]
as the total demand of firm j when joining both platforms. Following Caplin
and Nalebuff (1991), if we show that 1/Dj is convex, then the profit function
of each seller is quasiconcave in its own price. This condition is equivalent to
2D′2j −DjD′′j > 0. We have that:
D′j = −κAg(aA + pj − p∗p)− κBg(aB + pj − p∗p). (32)
D′′j = −κAg′(aA + pj − p∗p)− κBg′(aB + pj − p∗p). (33)
Therefore, the condition can be written as
2[κ2Ag2(aA + pj − p∗p) + κ2Bg2(aB + pj − p∗p) + 2κAκBg(aA + pj − p∗p)g(aB + pj − p∗p)]
+ κ2Ag′(aA + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aA + pj − p∗p)) + κ2Bg′(aB + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aB + pj − p∗p))
+ κAκB [g′(aA + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aB + pj − p∗p)) + g′(aB + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aA + pj − p∗p))] > 0
Because g(x) is logconcave, then 1−G(x) is logconcave, meaning that g2(x) +
g′(x)(1−G(x)) ≥ 0. Therefore, taking all the terms proportional to κ2A and to κ2B
we have
κ2A[2g2(aA + pj − p∗p) + κ2Ag′(aA + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aA + pj − p∗p))] ≥ 0,
and
κ2B [2g2(aB + pj − p∗p) + κ2Bg′(aB + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aB + pj − p∗p))] ≥ 0.
Then, it is sufficient to show that the remainder terms (all proportional to κAκB)
are strictly greater than 0. This reduces to (the terms κAκB cancel out as they
are always positive)
4g(aA + pj − p∗p)g(aB + pj − p∗p) + g′(aA + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aB + pj − p∗p))
+g′(aB + pj − p∗p)(1−G(aA + pj − p∗p)) > 0.
This condition holds directly if g′(x) is positive. We derive a condition on s such
that this condition holds even for the minimum value for g′(x). The logconcavity
of 1−G(x) implies that g′(x) ≥ − g(x)(1−G(x)) . We replace this lower bound for g
′(x)
and rearranging terms we get
4−
λ(aB + pj − p∗p)
λ(aA + pj − p∗p)
−
λ(aA + pj − p∗p)
λ(aB + pj − p∗p)
> 0.
Note that this expression always hold in a symmetric equilibrium in the ob-
fuscation game between platforms where aA = aB . As the difference between
reservation values increase, the condition might not hold. Given that the max-
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imum difference between λ(aA + pj − p∗p) and λ(aB + pj − p∗p) depends on the
maximum difference between aA and aB for a fixed pj , if s is not too small, then
a is not too big and the condition is satisfied as even when a platform, say A, sets
aA = a, then the biggest value that platform B can choose is aB = a and the
condition is still satisfied.
Given that all sellers’s profit function are quasiconcave, the unique equilibrium
price equilibrium at the sellers’ stage is given by taking the first order conditions of
the sellers’ maximization problem, assuming symmetry and we obtain expression
(16).
Proof of proposition 2
First, we show that there exists a unique symmetric bottleneck equilibrium when
PPCs are exogenously given following the same steps than in Proposition 1. Then,
we compare it with the case with no price parity clauses.






2t = 0. (34)
Due to the log-concavity assumption on the distribution of match values, we have





, obtaining the following function:







If this function intersects 0 at most at a unique value of aA, the original first-order
condition also intersects 0 at most once. Differentiating ψ(aA, aB) with respect to
aA we get (we omit a positive dividing term)
∂ψ(aA, aB)
∂aA




which is strictly greater than 0 if g(x) is log-concave, due to assumption 1. There-
fore, ψ(aA, aB) is strictly increasing in aA and must intersect 0 at most once, and
therefore the original first order-condition also intersects 0 at most once. In case
that the first-order conditions intersect 0, it must be from positive to negative,
implying that the profit function is quasiconcave on its own reservation value.
ii) To show that the equilibrium is unique, we take the first-order conditions
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2t = 0. (37)
Following the same steps as in i), we divide by λ′(a∗) and show that the new





′2 − λλ′′] (38)
which is strictly greater than 0 due to assumption 1. Therefore, the first-order
conditions in a symmetric equilibrium intersect 0 at most once. In case the first
order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium intersect 0, it must be from positive
to negative, implying the equilibrium is unique. Following the same steps as in
Proposition 1, it can be shown that there exist tp < tp such that if t is greater or
lower than these boundaries, the unique equilibrium is given by corner solutions
with a∗p = a or a∗p = a
To compare the equilibrium with and without price parity clauses, we focus
on interior solutions for both cases, as at corner solutions the levels of obfuscation
are the same. Replacing the value a∗p that solves the first-order conditions for
a symmetric equilibrium when PPCs are set in the first-order conditions for a





This term is positive if λ′(a∗p) < −1, meaning that when replacing a∗p in the
first-order condition when PPCs are not imposed leads to a positive first-order
condition. Therefore, to satisfy the condition, the value of a∗ when PPCs are not
set must be higher than a∗p, in order to reduce the first-order condition back to
0. This implies that a∗ > a∗p and s∗ < s∗p and equilibrium prices are higher when
PPCs are imposed. The other case is solved analogously. When λ′(a∗p) = −1, both
first-order conditions are satisfied and PPCs make no difference in equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 2




Therefore, λ(a∗p) increases with t (a∗p decreases with t). Suppose λ is strictly
concave. Then, a higher t increases λ and λ′ becomes smaller in absolute value.
Thus, if t is high enough, λ′ becomes greater than −1 and PPCs lead to lower
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obfuscation and prices. The analysis when λ is convex is analogous.
Proof of proposition 3
We prove each case separately. Define a∗ as the equilibrium reservation value given
in proposition 1 when no price parity clauses are in place and a∗p as the equilibrium
reservation value when price parity are exogenously given as in proposition 2.
Price parity equilibrium: suppose both platform set price parity clauses,
set search costs according to (22) and leave sellers with 0 profits through their
fixed fee. This is the unique bottleneck equilibrium if both platforms set price
parity clauses, according to proposition 2. The only possible deviation would be
a platform not setting price parity clauses.
Suppose platform A deviates and does not set a price parity clause:
i) If A increases aA, there is a downward pressure on p∗A, but because of the
price parity of platform B, the prices must remain the same in both platforms,
as long as sellers keep multi-homing. Therefore, the initial value of aA = a∗p was
already a best response for A, so this cannot be a deviation.
However, this deviation may be profitable if sellers leave platform B and there-
fore A gets all the market. However, in this case, at t = 2 platform B will respond
by lowering their fixed fee such that sellers don’t leave their platform. Therefore,
this deviation is not profitable.
ii) If A decreases aA, there is an upward pressure on p∗A, leading to p∗A > p∗B ,
therefore the price parity clause set by platform B is not binding and equilib-
rium prices in the sellers subgame is given by the base case with no price parity.
However, if a∗p < a∗, meaning price parity leads to higher obfuscation and prices,
the first order condition of the no price parity case for platform A, starting from
aA = aB = a∗p is positive, meaning that lowering aA cannot be a deviation. If it
was the case that a∗p > a∗, the first order condition would be negative and this
indeed would be a profitable deviation. There is no possible delisting possibility
from either platform when price parity clauses are not binding.
Therefore, if a∗p < a∗, both platforms setting price parity clauses is the unique
bottleneck equilibrium of the game.
No price parity equilibrium: suppose both platform do not set price parity
clauses, set search costs according to (12) and leave sellers with 0 profits through
their revenue sharing fee. This is the unique bottleneck equilibrium if both plat-
forms do not set price parity clauses, according to proposition 2. The only possible
deviation would be a platform setting price parity clauses.
Suppose platform A deviates and sets a price parity clause:
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i) If A increases aA, there is a a downward pressure on p∗A, but then the price
parity clause set by A is not binding. Therefore, the initial value of aA = a∗ was
already a best response for A, so this cannot be a deviation. There is no possible
delisting possibility from either platform when price parity clauses are not binding.
ii) If A decreases aA, there is an upward pressure on p∗A, leading to p∗A > p∗B ,
and then the price parity clause set by A becomes binding, as long as sellers
continue to multi-home. However, if a∗p > a∗, meaning price parity leads to lower
obfuscation and prices, the first order condition of the price parity case for platform
A, starting from aA = aB = a∗ is positive, meaning that lowering aA cannot be a
deviation.
However, this deviation may be profitable if sellers leave platform B and there-
fore A gets all the market. However, in this case, at t = 2 platform B will respond
by lowering their fixed fee such that sellers don’t leave their platform. Therefore,
this deviation is not profitable.
If it was the case that a∗p < a∗, the first order condition would be negative and
this indeed would be a profitable deviation.
Therefore, if a∗p > a∗, both platforms setting price parity clauses is the unique
bottleneck equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 3
The following Lemma shows that right-hand truncations of log-concave distribu-
tions functions satisfy Assumption 1, if the truncation point is small enough (but
strictly greater than 0):
Lemma 3. Assume g(x) is a strictly positive everywhere and log-concave density
function in [0, v]. Let gt(x, h) be the right hand truncation of g(x) at h < v and
define λt(x, h) as the Mills ratio of the truncated distribution. Then:
• λt(x, h) is strictly increasing in h.
• There exists a ĥ > 0 such that ∀ h < ĥ, λt(x, h) is strictly log-concave
∀x ∈ (0, h].





where G(h) < 1 if h < v. This expression is clearly strictly increasing in h as G(x)
is a cumulative distribution function and the density function is strictly positive
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everywhere. Differentiating with respect to x we have
λ′t(x, h) = −1−
g′(x)
g(x) λt(x, h), (42)
and










The condition for λt(x, h) to be log-concave is given by λ′′t (x, h)λt(x, h)−λ′2t (x, h) <
0. Some algebra leads to










As λt(x, h) is strictly increasing in h and we know that, because h < ∞, then
|g′(x)| <∞ and |g′′(x)| <∞ (bounded derivatives in a compact set), if h is small
enough, the second and third terms become small and the condition is satisfied.
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We provide a new interpretation for coalition loyalty programs in an en-
vironment where consumers search for their preferred products. A dominant
firm in one market can generate a prominent position for another firm in an
unrelated market, by offering a reward to consumers conditionally on buy-
ing in both firms. We show when it is optimal for consumers to sample first
the firms in the coalition. We derive conditions under which this coalition
is profitable in comparison with a case with no coalition and in comparison
with a case where the dominant firm creates a loyalty program only in its
own market. We find that the coalition can be profitable if and only if it
increases consumer surplus. Then, we explore the case where a continuum
of coalitions compete, and show that in this case, consumer surplus is lower,
industry profits are higher, and total welfare is ambiguous, relative with a
case with no coalitions.
Keywords: coalition loyalty programs, consumer search, prominence.
JEL Classifications: D83, L10, M21.
1 Introduction
Coalition loyalty programs (CLPs), also known as joint or partnership loyalty
programs, allow consumers to collect points from any merchant affiliated to the
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network and exchange them for rewards and discounts in other merchants from the
same coalition. While the different explanations for standalone loyalty programs
(SLPs) are extensively discussed in the literature, CLPs remain surprisingly un-
explored, despite their growing popularity around the world.1 We provide a new
explanation for why merchants engage in CLPs and offer a new framework to un-
derstand their effects on consumers’ behavior and welfare. In our interpretation, as
consumers must engage in costly search in order to find their preferred products, a
CLP generates prominent positions to their merchants in consumers’ search order.
Consider, for example, that two firms from different markets form a CLP. After
a consumer buys in either firm, when he searches in the other market, it is natural
that he will begin searching the firm from the same CLP. Therefore, this firm
becomes “prominent” for these consumers. The effects of prominence on search
markets are studied by Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), where they show that
prominence has adverse effects on consumer surplus and total welfare when the
prominent position is exogenously given. We contribute to this analysis by con-
sidering that a CLP can generate endogenous positions of prominence. However,
coalitions must offer (costly) rewards and benefits to consumers to obtain such
positions. Therefore, the final effects on equilibrium prices, profits and welfare are
ambiguous.
There are many examples of successful coalition loyalty programs. An eminent
case is observed in the airline industry, where there exist three main coalitions,
namely OneWorld, SkyTeam, and Star Alliance. Each of these coalitions is com-
posed of several airlines, and reward points can be earned and redeemed in different
airlines from the same coalition. Card coalitions, such as Nordstrom, Payback in
Germany, and Nectar in the UK, gather several merchants from different markets
into the same loyalty program with success.
There are still several open questions regarding CLPs in the literature. In
Basso et al. (2015), the authors explore these questions and summarize the open
alleys for research in this area. For example, CLPs can be formed by a dominant
firm organizing the program or by several equal-level partners organized by an
independent managing firm. The relative profitability of both types of programs
and the benefits for their participants are still open questions: the number of firms
that should belong to the coalition, from which markets, the rewards structure and
the cost-sharing of these rewards, the behavior of consumers under such programs,
and the effects on consumer surplus and total welfare, among many others.
We take a step in answering these questions by assuming that consumers search
1From the 3.8 billion LP memberships in the U.S., around 16% of the memberships are with
CLPs. In Canada, CLPs grew 78% between 2014 and 2016, reaching 27 million memberships.
See Colloquy report (2017).
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for their preferred goods and that CLPs might affect their search behavior. We
consider a dominant firm in a given market forming a coalition with a firm from
another market. This firm is dominant in our model as we assume that all con-
sumers start searching in this firm’s market. There are many reasons why consumer
searches might be ordered in such a way. For example, some goods can be chrono-
logically bought before others, as is the case with plane tickets and hotel rooms
or car rentals. Some products are in high demand, and therefore most consumers
buy those products before buying products in less tight markets, as is the case
with prominent airline routes with respect to routes with low demand.
In our model, there are two markets, and we take a coalition of one firm from
each market as given. In each market, there is a continuum of competitors outside
of the CLP. The coalition offers a reward T if consumers buy the product of both
firms in the coalition, and offering this reward costs C to the member firms. How
to offer a higher reward of T at a lower cost of C is the source of considerable
attention in the marketing literature. To focus on our main contribution, which
is the impact of a CLP on search behavior, we assume that these parameters are
exogenously given. Also, firms share the cost of the reward, where the firm in the
second market pays a share of α of this reward. We characterize the equilibrium
of the game by taking α also as an exogenous parameter.
Under these assumptions, we derive an equilibrium where the reward T acts
as a demand shifter in the second market, as consumers that already bought from
the dominant firm only get the reward if they buy from the second firm in the
coalition. In addition, the cost of the reward is passed through to the final prices.
Therefore, the price of the second firm is higher than without a CLP. Under a
simple condition, even if the price is higher, the reward compensates for this fact,
and consumers are, on average, better off. However, as the price is higher, only
consumers that bought from the dominant firm will ever sample the coalition’s firm
in the second period. In the first period, when consumers sample the dominant
firm, they take into account the “expected reward” of buying from this firm, which
also acts as a demand shifter. Therefore, the price of the dominant firm is also
higher. In equilibrium, consumer surplus increases on average if and only if the
coalition is profitable for the firms, with respect to a case with no loyalty program.
However, consumers that bought from the dominant firm and not from the partner
are worse off. The coalition is profitable if and only if, for a given level of reward
T , the cost C is not too high. In fact, if T = C, representing a case where the
reward is cash or a discount, the CLP is never profitable. Therefore, if the CLP
is not creating value, it cannot be profitable.
We then compare the outcome of the dominant firm CLP with a case where
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this firm decides to offer the reward T directly upon purchase, and not conditional
on buying in another firm, in what we call a standalone loyalty program (SLP). We
compare the profit of the dominant firm in both cases and analyze when it is more
profitable to create each type of loyalty program. We derive a simple condition
under which each program is the most profitable.
Then, we analyze the case where a continuum of CLPs compete with each
other. Every firm in market A forms a CLP with a firm in market B, and offers
the same reward T at the same cost C. When the level of reward is relatively
high, in equilibrium, every consumer buys from firms in the same CLP. After
choosing a firm in market A, they become “locked” to the partner firm in market
B. Therefore, on average, they buy worse products and pay higher prices, even if
they get the reward. Consumer surplus goes down, while industry profits increase.
Total welfare increases if and only if the cost of the reward C is not too high.
Thus, competition between CLPs hurt consumers relative to the case with only
one CLP.
Finally, as an extension, we provide some preliminary results for the case when
half of the consumers start in each market. We call this case a symmetric CLP.
We show that the equilibrium price from firms in the CLP lies between the prices
of the case of a dominant firm CLP. We also show that, for some parameters,
this CLP increases consumer welfare, and it is indeed profitable for consumers to
sample first the firms in the CLP. A full characterization of this case is left for
further research.
Related Literature
This article is the first to explore coalition loyalty programs under a consumer
search environment. Gardete and Lattin (2018), in a similar setting but without
search, also study CLPs in a setting where there are two markets and two firms
in each of them. Each of the four firms has a segment of loyal consumers, and
they leverage their market power to another market through the CLP. The CLP is
profitable if rewards are chosen after prices, due to firms leveraging their market
power to the other market. Their model considers a symmetric case while ours
focuses on a dominant firm loyalty program. We consider this work as highly
complementary to ours. A relevant difference between this work and ours is that
they find that the CLP can be profitable even when the reward is given as a cash
discount to consumers, while in our model, this is never profitable.
There is a wide literature analyzing individual or standalone loyalty programs.
The main explanations for loyalty programs include price discrimination, switching
costs, barriers to entry, database marketing and collusion. Basso, Clements and
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Ross (2009) summarize the main literature and provide an alternative explanation
based on a moral hazard problem between employers that pay for the tickets who
book travels and have incentives to increase their loyalty rewards. Another part of
the literature is focused on whether loyalty programs effectively increase demand.
For example, Lederman (2007, 2008) shows that enhancements to airlines’ coalition
loyalty programs increase demand on routes departing from airports at which the
airline is dominant. In the present paper, we focus on CLPs to highlight a specific
benefit of CLPs relative to SLPs: the LP may generate prominence for partner
firms who otherwise would not be prominent.
Gans and King (2006) and Armstrong (2013) study the possibility of firms of
different markets offering a discount when consumers buy the products together.
The main difference with our paper is that consumers know valuations from all
firms when buying the bundle, while in our model, consumers must sequentially
and costly search markets and products. The first paper studies a setting two
markets and two firms in each market, and a pair of firms offering a discounted
price for both products can create interdependence between products otherwise
independent. One pair of firms offering a bundle earns greater profits, but if both
pairs of firms bundle, profits are the same as in a no bundling case while consumer
surplus and total welfare are reduced due to distorted decisions by consumers. The
second paper shows that firms can unilaterally have incentives to offer a discount
for their product conditional on a consumer buying the other product when the
demand for the bundle is more elastic than the demand of the firm’s product.
Another important difference with our work is that we assume that the cost of the
reward can be lower than the reward itself, while in their models, the cost of the
discount for buying the bundle is equal to the level of reward.
Our article is greatly related and borrows from the analysis of prominence
on search markets of Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009). They show, using
the search environment developed by Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault
(1999), how a position of prominence exogenously given in the search order of
consumers, leads to a lower price and higher profits from the prominent firm,
while the other firms increase their prices and consumer surplus and total welfare
is reduced, as long as there is a finite number of firms on the market. When
there is an infinite number of firms in the market, prominence only increases
profits of the prominent firm, while prices, consumer surplus and total welfare
are unchanged. Our model describes a situation where a firm can endogenously
generate a prominent position for another firm in another market through a CLP,
and when this strategy is profitable. As we assume that there is an infinite number
of firms in our model, the channel through which the non-prominent firms increase
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prices is shut down.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up
the model of a dominant firm CLP, and derive our main results. In Section 3,
we study the case of competing CLPs. Then, in Section 4, we extend the base
model to consider a symmetric setting where half of the consumers start searching
in market A and half start in market B. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2 The model
Consider two product markets, A and B, each one served by a unit mass of horizon-
tally differentiated sellers producing at 0 marginal cost. A unit mass of consumers
has unit demand for each good. The value of each firm’s product is idiosyncratic
to consumers, and it is only learned after costly search. The surplus of buying
from firm j, net of search costs, is εij − pj , where εij is the idiosyncratic match
utility of consumer i derived from firm j and pj is the price of firm j. We assume
that εij is distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1]. Consumers face a search cost
s each time the sample a firm. Consumers have rational expectations and passive
beliefs over the sequence of equilibrium prices. This means that consumers cor-
rectly anticipate equilibrium prices and that this expectation is not affected when
a price deviation is observed in the search process. The search process is without
replacement, and there is costless recall, so that consumers can always come back
and buy from a previously sampled firm.
We assume that a firm in each market, denoted as A1 and B1, form a coalition
loyalty program (CLP), offering a reward of value T if a consumer buys from both
firms. The cost of this reward is C. A share α ∈ [0, 1] of this cost is paid by
firm B1 and the remainder 1− α is paid by A1. We assume that T , C and α are
exogenous. We assume all consumers start their search process in market A, and
after purchasing, they search and buy in market B. This assumption represents
real-life situations such as consumers buying a plane ticket in a prominent route,
and at a later date, they buy a ticket in another route. Another example is
consumers buying plane tickets and afterward being offered the possibility to rent
a hotel room or a car at a discounted price. We discuss, as an extension, the case
where half of the consumers start searching in each market.
As all consumers start searching in market A, we assume that firm A1 is the
dominant firm of the CLP. This firm charges a fixed fee F to firm B1. The timing
of the game is the following:
• t=1: taking the coalition as given, sellers simultaneously set prices in both
markets.
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• t=2: consumers search and purchase in market A and then in market B.
Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
 Preliminaries. We start by characterizing the search behavior of consumers
in the absence of the CLP, as it is already studied in the literature. Suppose all
firms are charging a symmetric equilibrium price p∗ in a given market. As all
prices charge the same price, the consumers’ search order is random. As shown in
Weitzman (1979), once in the market, when a consumer samples a firm, say firm
j, he will stop and buy from that firm if the net surplus εij − pj is greater than a
reservation utility a− p∗, where the reservation value a satisfies∫ 1
a
(x− a)dx = s, (1)
implying that a = 1 −
√
2s due to our assumption on the distribution. Given
that there exists an infinite number of firms, consumers eventually find a suitable
product. Therefore it is never optimal to come back and buy from a previously
sampled firm. It also means that once consumers join the market, consumers
always purchase a product, and the market is covered.
In a symmetric price equilibrium between sellers, the expected number of con-
sumers searching a given seller is 1 (due to the normalization of the number and
firms and consumers) in the first round of consumers’ search. The probability of
a consumer buying in any given seller when it is sampled is 1− a. Therefore, the
expected number of consumers sampling any seller in the second round is a, in the
third round is a2, and so son. Now, suppose seller j deviates from the equilibrium.
A consumer buys from firm j if and only if eij − pj ≥ a − p∗k, where p∗k is the
equilibrium price in platform k. Therefore, seller j’s demand is given by
∞∑
l
[al][1− pj + a− p∗)] =
1− a− pj + p∗
1− a . (2)
Therefore, firm j’s profit function is given by
Πj = pj
[1− a− pj + p∗]
1− a . (3)
Maximizing with respect to pj , leading to a symmetric equilibrium with p∗ = 1−a.
The expected consumer surplus of the full process is given by a − p∗ = 2a − 1.
Therefore, we need that a ≥ 12 (equivalently s ≥
1
8 ) so consumers participate in
the market. Industry profit is p∗, while individual firms make 0 profits.
Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) extend this analysis and show that, when
a firm is exogenously prominent, meaning that it is sampled first by all consumers,
the equilibrium price is unchanged, provided there is an infinite number of firms
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in the market. The only difference, in this case, is that the prominent firm makes
positive profits, while consumer surplus and industry profits remain the same.
When there is a finite number of firms in the market, however, the prominent firm
charges a lower price while non-prominent firms charge a higher price, leading
to lower output, consumer surplus, and total welfare, while the prominent firm
still increases its profits. We abstract from the strategic price response from non-
prominent firms by assuming markets with infinite numbers of firms.
 The impact of a coalition loyalty program. We characterize an equilib-
rium where the firms that belong to the CLP charge higher prices than the rest
of the firms. At the same time, it is still optimal for consumers to search these
firms due to the offered reward. Non-prominent firms charge symmetric prices
in each market. We rule out potential equilibria where the firms from the CLP
are never sampled because consumers expect very high prices at these firms, and
firms charge those prices as they expect 0 demand in any case. To avoid corner
solutions and ensure that consumers participate in the market even in the case
without CLP, we make the following assumptions on the parameters of the model:
Assumption 1: T,C ≤ 1 and a ≥ 12 .
To start the analysis, we describe firm B1’s behavior at t = 2. In equilibrium,
consumers expect firm B1 to charge a higher price than the rest of the firms
in market B, as this firm has higher demand from consumers who bought from
A1 and because it passes through some of the cost of this reward to final prices.
Therefore, only consumers that bought from firm A1 will sample firm B1. Assume
that consumers sample firmB1 first (we show later that this is the optimal behavior
in equilibrium). Then, firm B1 maximizes
ΠB1(pB1) = (pB1 − αC)DB1(pB1) (4)
with respect to pB1. The number of consumers that bought from firm A1 is taken
as given at this stage. To derive DB1, note that consumers sampling B1 buy from
this firm if and only if εB1−pB1 ≥ a−p∗2B−T , where p∗2B is the equilibrium price
of the rest of the firms in market B. If consumers obtain a low enough match value
at firm B1, they randomly search the rest of the firms. At this point, the incentives
of non-prominent firms are the same as in a market without a CLP. Therefore, the
symmetric equilibrium price of non-prominent firms is given by p∗2B = 1 − a, as
shown in the preliminaries. Therefore, firm B1’s demand is given by the condition
Pr(εB1 ≥ 2a − 1 + pB1 − T ), times the number of consumers that buy from A1.
This is equal to
DB1 = DA1(2(1− a) + T − pB1). (5)
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Maximizing ΠB1 with respect to pB1 leads to
p∗B1 = 1− a+
T + αC
2 . (6)
This price is higher than the one in the absence of a CLP for two reasons. First,
the reward T is analogous to a shift in demand for product B1, and second, part
of the cost of the reward paid by firm B1 is passed through to the final price. The
reason why B1 cannot fully pass-through the shift in demand and cost to the final
price is that if it charges a too high price, consumers keep on searching the rest of
the firms, even if they do not provide a reward.
Even if this price is higher, consumers obtaining the reward pay an effective
price at t = 2 of p∗B1 − T = 1− a−
(T−αC)
2 . Therefore, if
T − αC ≥ 0, (7)
it is optimal for consumers that previously bought from firm A1 to sample firm
B1 first in the second period. Thus, firm B1 becomes prominent for consumers,
conditional on having bought from firm A1. Therefore, T −αC ≥ 0 is a necessary
condition for the CLP to be profitable.
Given that consumers get a reward if they buy in firm B1, they are willing to
accept a lower match value from this firm, compared to a case without a CLP.
Firm B1’s demand in equilibrium is
D∗B1 = DA1
[
(1− a) + T − αC2
]
, (8)
while B1’s profit is given by
Π∗B1 = DA1
[
(1− a) + T − αC2
]2
. (9)
This result highlights how the CLP can make firm B1 prominent in market B for
consumers that buy from firm A1, increasing its profits relative to the case with
no CLP, where B1 made negligible profits. Then, firm A1 can extract these profits
using the fixed fee F .
At t = 1, consumers buying from firm A1 anticipate that they have the pos-
sibility of earning a reward in the following period. This expected reward (ER)
represents the difference in the continuation payoffs for consumers of buying from
firm A1 relative to buying in any other firm. If a consumer buys from A1, he will
sample firm B1 first at t = 2. Then, he has the possibility of earning a reward if
the match value is not too low. If the match value is low, then he keeps search-
ing for the rest of the firms. The expected utility of this process relative to the
expected utility of only sampling no CLP firms and never earning a reward repre-
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sents the expected reward for consumers from buying in A1. This expected reward
increases the demand of firm A1, as long as the ER is positive. The expression for
the ER is derived in the following Lemma (proofs for all results are provided in
the Appendix):
Lemma 1. Define φB = T−αC2 . Suppose that T > αC. Then, the expected reward
for consumers buying from firm A1 is given by
ER = φB(1− a) +
φ2B
2 (10)
The expected reward is increasing in T , decreasing in C, decreasing in the reser-
vation value a and increasing in the search cost s. 
This expected reward is increasing in T and decreasing in C, as this cost is
passed through to the price of firm B1, decreasing both the value of buying from
that firm and the probability of doing so. A higher search cost increases the
expected reward as consumers know it is more likely that they will buy in firm B1
in the future, while the price of firm B1 increases in the same amount than the
price of the other firms in market B. Note that the ER is higher than 0 if and
only if T −αC > 0, which is the same condition for firm B1 to be prominent once
consumers reach that market. From now on, we assume this condition holds, so
the CLP is active in equilibrium.
With this expression for the ER, we can derive firm A1’s demand. A consumer
sampling firm A1 buys from that firm if and only if εA1 − pA1 ≥ a − p∗2A − ER.
Following the same logic as in market B, the price of the rest of the sellers is
p∗2A = 1− a. Therefore
DA1 = 2(1− a)− pA1 + ER. (11)
The profit function is given by
ΠA1 = pA1DA1 − (1− α)CD∗B1. (12)
Maximizing with respect to pA1 leads to
p∗A1 = (1− a) +
ER
2 +
(1− α)C(1− a+ φB)
2 , (13)
In a similar fashion than for firm B1, firm A1 charges a higher price due to the
higher demand generated by the ER, and because it passes through some of the
cost of this reward to final consumers. Note that for firm A1, the price increase
relative to a case with no CLP is proportional to 1 − a through the expression
for the ER, because the value of the expected reward is proportional to the value
of being prominent for firm B1 in the following period, which is increasing in the
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search cost (decreasing in the reservation value a). Additionally, even if α = 1,
meaning that firm B1 pays fully for the reward C, this price depends on C. The
intuition is that, even if firm A1 does not pay for the reward in this particular case,
the probability of buying from firm B1, and therefore the value of the expected
reward, is affected by C through the price charged by firm B1.
The equilibrium demand for firm A1 is given by
D∗A1 = (1− a) + (1− a)
(









while its profit equal to Π∗A1 = (D∗A1)2. As firm A1 extracts all profits generated
by firm B1, the total profit of A1 through the CLP is given by ΠAB = Π∗A1 +Π∗B1,









φA ≡ (1− a)
(









meaning that D∗A1 = 1 − a + φA. With the equilibrium prices and demands, we
can compute the expected consumer surplus:
Proposition 1. If consumers sample the CLP, their expected consumer surplus
is given by
CS = 4a− 2 + φ
2
A
2 + φA(1− a). (17)
Consumer surplus increases with T , decreases with C, increases with the reserva-
tion value a and decreases with the search cost s. 
As in Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), the existence of a prominent firm
in each market decreases the match value that consumers are willing to accept
in those firms, as the price charged to consumers, in their analysis, is lower than
the price in the rest of the firms. In our model, the price charged by A1 and B1
is greater than the base price charge by firms outside of the CLP (or by firms
in absence of a CLP), but the effective price, considering the reward, is lower.
Therefore, on average, consumers find worse products when the CLP is active.
Also, as the prominent firms charge a lower effective price, the average number of
searches made by consumers is lower, meaning they face lower total search costs.
On average, consumer surplus is given by expression (17). A relevant difference
between their model and ours is that consumers that buy at A1 but then get a
low match value in B1, and therefore purchase from another firm in the B market,
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pay a higher price in the first period without enjoying the reward in the second
stage. Therefore, some groups of consumers end up worse than others.
With Proposition 1, we can analyze the profitability of the CLP for firm A1.
Note that the expected consumer surplus in the absence of a CLP is given by 4a−2.
Therefore, the expression for the expected consumer surplus acts as a restriction
for the CLP, as consumers only participate in the CLP and sample firms A1 and B1
if their expected consumer surplus increases, or if φ
2
A
2 +φA(1− a) > 0. Otherwise,
consumers never sample any firm in the coalition.
Now, we analyze the profitability of the CLP for firm A1. As a benchmark,
we use the case where firm A1 is exogenously prominent in market A, and analyze
whether it is profitable for this firm to create the CLP.2 We derive the following
result:
Proposition 2. The CLP is profitable if and only if it (weakly) increases consumer
surplus. Thus, for every α ∈ [0, 1], if C is not too high, there exists a threshold
T̃ (α, a, C), such that if T > T̃ (α, a, C), the CLP is profitable. The threshold
T̃ (α, a, C) is decreasing in α and increasing in a and in C. In particular, if α = 1,
it is enough that T > C for the CLP to be profitable. 
This result highlights the two main ingredients for the CLP to be profitable.
First, it must increase consumer surplus to encourage consumers to participate.
Second, this happens only if the level of reward is high enough relative to its cost.
Else, the pass-through rate from the cost of the reward to prices is too high, and
consumers will not participate. If firm A1 would be integrated with firm B1, even if
the level of reward is not too high, the integrated firm could charge prices in both
markets such that consumers would participate. As firm B1 is an independent
firm, this is not possible, and therefore, when T is relatively small, the CLP fails
to be profitable.
A particular case of interest is given by T = C, meaning that the cost of the
reward is equal to the reward itself. This represents a case where the reward is
a cash discount on the price of firm B1 conditional on buying from both firms in
the coalition. We obtain the following result:
Corollary 1. If T = C, meaning that the reward is given as a cash discount, the
CLP is never profitable. 
Proof. If T = C, for any α, φA < 0. Therefore, consumer surplus goes down,
consumers do not participate in the CLP, and therefore it is not profitable.
2If we consider that firm A1 is non-prominent in market A as a benchmark case, it would
mean that it makes 0 profits and the CLP would always be profitable. We are interested in
whether extending prominence to another market is profitable.
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When T = C, for any level of α, the pass-through from the cost of the reward
to final prices is both markets is so high that consumers do not obtain any benefit
from the CLP. As consumer surplus goes down, consumers never sample any firm
in the CLP. This means that a CLP cannot be profitable if it does not create some
value, given by a level of reward greater than its cost. This result contrasts with
the one obtained by Gardete and Lattin (2018), wherein a model with no search
and with two markets and two firms in each market, CLPs might be profitable
even with T = C. The main difference with our model is that in our case, the
CLP is constrained by optimal search behavior, and therefore, it must leave some
surplus to consumers to make them participate.
Finally, we analyze the effect of the CLP in total industry profits and total
welfare:
Proposition 3. If the CLP is profitable for the members for the coalition, total
industry profits and total welfare increase.
This result is straightforward and doesn’t need a formal proof. If the CLP is
profitable, it means that firm A1 it is increasing its profits while leaving firm B1
indifferent with respect to a case without a CLP. The rest of the firms in both
markets charge the same price as before. Therefore, total industry profits increase
in both markets. If total profits increase, and so does consumer surplus, naturally
total welfare increases.
Next, we compare the profits for firm A1 with a case where that firm offers a
reward T only conditional on consumers buying from that firm, and not contingent
on also buying from a firm in another market.
Coalition vs standalone loyalty program: now, we compare the CLP
with a standalone loyalty program (SLP). Suppose firm A1 can decide to make a
loyalty program that offers a reward T at cost C conditional on consumers buying
its product (and not conditional on also buying from another firm). This could
also be interpreted as firm A1 increasing the quality of its product by T at a cost
C. The timing of the game, in this case, is the following:
• t=1: Firm A1 and the rest of the firms in market A simultaneously set prices.
• t=2: Consumers search and purchase in market A.
We start by assuming that firm A1 is prominent. Then we check that, in fact,
it is optimal for consumers to sample A1 first. Therefore, firm A1’s demand is
given by
DA1(pA1) = 1− a+ T − pA1 + p∗2A, (18)
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where, by the same logic than in the previous section, p∗2A = 1−a is the symmetric
expected equilibrium price of the non-prominent firms. Firm A1’s profit function
is given by
ΠA1(p1) = [pA1 − C]DA1(pA1). (19)
Taking the first-order condition leads to an equilibrium price equal to
p∗A1 = (1− a) +
(T + C)
2 , (20)
The effective price payed by consumers is p∗A1 − T , or
p∗A1 − T = (1− a)−
(T − C)
2 . (21)
Therefore, if T > C, it is indeed optimal for consumers to sample firm A1 first.
The equilibrium profit of firm A1 is
ΠS∗A1 =
[
(1− a) + (T − C)2
]2
, (22)
The following result compares the profitability of a SLP with a CLP:
Proposition 4. If C and the reservation value a are not too high, there exists a
T (α, a, C) such that if T > T (α, a, C), the CLP is more profitable than the SLP.
The threshold T (a,C) is increasing in a and C. Moreover, we have that T > T̃ .

The intuition for this result is as follows. When forming a CLP, firm A1
reduces the reward offered to consumers by making it conditional on also buying
from another firm in another market. Therefore, firm A1 charges a lower price
and gets a lower profit from market A. However, by creating a CLP, firm A1
generates a prominent position for firm B1 in market B, and then extracts these
extra profits through the fixed fee F . Therefore, forming a CLP is more profitable
than the SLP if the value of the prominent position in market B is higher than
the direct profit obtained by A1 by directly offering a reward to its consumers. As
firm B1 is only prominent for consumers that buy from A1, its prominent position
is valuable only if the demand for firm A1 is high enough. This happens when the
reward T is sufficiently big, for fixed values of C and a.
The threshold for the level of the reward depends on the cost C, and the
reservation value a. If the cost is high, the pass-through to the equilibrium price
of A1 is high, and its demand is lower. Thus, a higher cost needs a higher level of
T to make the CLP profitable relative to the SLP. When the reservation value is
higher, or, equivalently, the search cost is smaller, the prominent position of firm
B1 is less valuable. This reduces the expected reward for consumers from buying
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at firm A1. Therefore, a higher reservation value needs a higher T to make the
CLP profitable. Finally, if the combination of C and a are too high, the CLP is
never more profitable than the SLP.
3 Competing CLPs
In this section, we extend the analysis to the case of competition between CLPs.
Suppose that every firm Aj in market A forms a CLP with a firm Bj in market
B. Every CLP offers the same reward T at the same cost C, and the share α of
the cost borne by each firm Bj in market B is the same for every coalition. We
look for a symmetric equilibrium where the price in each market is the same for
every firm.
There are two possible equilibria, depending on the value of the reward T
relative to the reservation value a. If T ≥ a, all consumers that buy from a firm j
in market A, purchases from the firm in the same CLP in market B. When T < a,
some consumers having bought in firm Aj will keep on searching after firm Bj in
market B. For simplicity, we characterize the first case, where consumers always
buy from firms in the same coalition.
At stage 2, any firm Bj, given the demand of its partner firm DAj , maximizes
ΠBj = (pBj − αC)DAj(1− a+ p∗B − pBj + T ), (23)
where p∗B is the expected equilibrium price in market B. Taking the first-order
condition with respect to pBj and assuming symmetry we obtain
p∗B = 1− a+ αC + T. (24)
In equilibrium, firms in market B fully pass-through to the equilibrium price, not
only their share of the cost of the CLP, but also the reward T. In contrast, when
only one CLP is active in the market, only half of the reward is passed through to
the final price of the firm in the CLP. The intuition is that, when only one CLP
is active, consumers expect lower prices from firms outside the CLP in market B,
constraining the price that the CLP can charge in market B. When there is a
continuum of CLPs, consumers expect every firm to charge a higher price.
The equilibrium demand of every firm B is given by DAj(1−a+T ). Therefore,
if T ≥ a, every consumer that buys in firm Aj buys in the firm of the same coalition
Bj. At stage 1, we also look for a symmetric price equilibrium. Firm Aj maximizes
ΠAj = (pAj − (1− α)C)
(1− a+ p∗A − pAj + ERj − ER∗)
(1− a) , (25)
where p∗A is the equilibrium price in market A, ERj is the expected reward derived
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from buying from Aj, and ER∗ is the equilibrium expected reward from firms in
market A. As every firm forms a CLP, there is no prominent firm in market A.
Therefore, consumers search randomly for firms in market A. Taking the first-order
condition with respect to p∗A leads to
p∗A = 1− a+ (1− α)C. (26)
Just as in market B, the price in market A increases with the share of the cost
paid by firms in market A. However, in contrast with the case with one CLP, the
expected reward for consumers is not translated to higher prices. The reason is that
the expected reward is defined as the difference in the continuation payoffs between
buying in one firm compared to the other firms. As every firm is offering the same
potential benefit at period 2, in a symmetric equilibrium, this expected reward is
0 for every firm. Therefore, there is no shift in demand, and the equilibrium price
doesn’t increase due to the potential benefit of obtaining a reward in market B.
The following proposition analyzes consumer surplus, industry profits, and
total welfare when comparing competing CLPs with a case with no CLP in any of
both markets:
Proposition 5. When there is a continuum of competing CLPs offering the same
reward T at the same cost C, consumer surplus goes down, and industry profits go
up. Total welfare goes up if and only if C is not too high.
Proof. See Appendix.
A continuum of competing CLPs, when T is relatively high, generates that each
firm in market B becomes prominent for some consumers, due to the possibility
of obtaining the reward. However, as all firms charge a high price, consumers are
effectively locked-in into these firms. This means that they are willing to accept
lower products to obtain the reward. This generates that the value of the reward is
fully passed through to final prices, along with the cost of providing such rewards,
and the final price paid by consumers is higher than in the absence of CLPs, even
net of the benefit T. This added to the fact that they accept worse products on
average, leads to consumer surplus going down. Given that consumer surplus goes
down, it may be that consumers do not find it profitable to join the market at all.
The market is active if and only if consumer surplus is non-negative (derivation of
CS is in the Appendix), or
CS = 4a− 2− a
2
2 − C ≥ 0. (27)
With respect to industry profits, it is straightforward to see that industry
profits go up (as long as the market is active), as the monopolistic competition
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in each market in the absence of CLPs is replaced with an equilibrium with high
prices and locked in consumers in market B. Finally, as consumers are getting
worse products on average, total welfare can only go up if the value created by
the rewards, represented by the difference between T and C is high enough, or, in
other words, if the cost of such reward is not too high.
Consumer surplus goes down, as the benefit from buying from a CLP, given
by the reward T , is fully passed-through to prices in the second period, given
that consumers are “locked” with the firm in the same CLP, due to the reward
being high. In contrast with the case where only one CLP exists, consumers do
not find optimal to search other firms in market B if the price is too high or the
match values are low, given that every firm is charging a high price in equilibrium.
Therefore, consumers end up worse off when CLPs compete with each other.
4 Extension: non-dominant firm CLP
The previous analysis assumes that consumers always start searching product A
first. While this assumption is relevant in some cases, in other situations, such as
purely independent goods, there is no natural search order for consumers. In this
section, we assume that the product search order is random. More precisely, half
of the consumers start searching in market A, and the other half start searching
for products in market B.
We look for a symmetric equilibrium where the equilibrium price charged by
both firms in the CLP, which we denote p∗1, is the same in both markets. All the
other firms are searched randomly. The price of the rest of the firms is p∗2 = 1− a,
just as in Section 2. Given the symmetry of this setting, we assume that α = 12 .
The timing of the game is the following:
• t=1: taking the coalition as given, sellers simultaneously set prices in both
markets.
• t=2: half of consumers start searching in each market, and then proceed to
search in the other market.
We derive the results for firm A1. The maximization problem for firm B1 is







2 (2(1− a)− pB1 + T )
)







[2(1− a)− pB1 + ERs)] [2(1− a)− pA1 + T ] ,
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where ERs(pB1) corresponds to the consumer’s expected reward of buying from
the CLP when the setting is symmetric. This profit function is explained as follows.
The first term corresponds to consumers that start their search in market A. The
term [2(1− a)− pA1 + ERs] is the demand from consumers buying from A1 in
the first period. The cost paid by A1 for those consumers is adjusted by the
probability that these consumers buy from firm B1 in the second period. The
second term corresponds to consumers that buy from B1 in the first period. The
number of such consumers is [2(1− a)− pB1 + ERs], while [2(1− a)− pA1 + T ]
is the demand of firm A1 for those consumers in the second period. As all of these
consumers get the reward, firm A1 pays C2 for all of them.
Define DTA1 = 2(1 − a) − pA1 + T , DEA1 = 2(1 − a) − pA1 + ERs, DTB1 =
2(1− a)− pB1 + T , and DEB1 = 2(1− a)− pB1 +ERs. The profit function of firm



















Taking the first-order condition with respect to pA1, and using the symmetry of





B1(p∗1) +DEB1(p∗1))− p∗1(1 +DEB1(p∗1)) = 0.
(29)
The first-order condition provides an implicit relationship between the equilibrium
price p∗1 and the equilibrium expected reward. As we cannot get an explicit solu-
tion for p∗1, we compute the expected reward as a function of p∗1 to have another
relationship between these variables. As in Section 2, the expected reward is the
difference between the continuation payoffs for consumers buying from A1 com-
pared to buying from any other firm in market A. This expected reward is given
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected reward at t = 1 of buying





3(1− a)2 + (p∗1 − T )2 − 4(1− a)(p∗1 − T )
)
(30)
The expected reward is decreasing in the equilibrium price p∗1. 
As we do not have an explicit solution for p∗1, we obtain the expected reward
as a function of this symmetric equilibrium price. The system of equation (29)
and (30) defines the equilibrium price of prominent firms p∗1 and the equilibrium
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expected reward. As this system does not admit an explicit solution, we provide
some simulation results. Figure 1 displays the relation between the equilibrium
price as a function of the reward level T .
Equilibrium prices as a function of T
Figure 1: Equilibrium prices p∗1 (blue), p∗A1 (orange, dots), p∗B1 (orange, dashed),
p∗2 (black), as a function of reward T. Model parameters: a = 0.8, C = 0, α = 0.5.
As expected, the equilibrium price of the firms in the CLP increases with T .
The price p∗1 of dominant firms, when the setting is symmetric, lies between that
of the dominant firm in an asymmetric setting p∗A1, and that of its partner p∗B1.
This is intuitive, as both firms now play the role of the dominant firm for half of
the market, and the role of the partner firm for the other half.
Now, we derive the expected consumer surplus for consumers and show that
it may be profitable, for some values of the parameters, for consumers to sample
the CLP. The expected consumer surplus is expected to decrease in market A and
increase in market B, due to the fact the the symmetric equilibrium price of firms
in the CLP is lower in market A and higher in market B, relative to the case of a
dominant firm CLP. To understand which effect dominates, Figure 2 displays the
relation between the expected consumer surplus and the reward level T .
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Figure 2: Expected consumer surplus in symmetric setting (blue), asymmetric
setting (orange, dashed) and without a CLP (black), as a function of reward T.
Model parameters: a = 0.8, C = 0, α = 0.5.
The expected consumer surplus is greater when there is no preferred order
search (symmetric setting). Indeed, simulations show that 2p∗ < pA1 +pB1, which
means that the actual price faced by consumers is, on average lower than when
the CLP is asymmetric. As the consumer surplus without a CLP is given by
4a− 2 = 0.6 for the assumed parameters, we have that the CLP might indeed be
used by consumers in equilibrium. In turn, consumer surplus might increase with
symmetric CLPs relative to dominant firm CLP.
We derived some preliminary results for a symmetric CLP, and show that the
main intuitions are maintained, relative to the dominant firm CLP. A full charac-
terization of the profitability and welfare analysis for all the possible parameters
is left for further research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we take the first step to interpret coalition loyalty programs based on
costly consumer search. As consumers often search for their preferred products,
a prominent firm in one market can extend its prominence to another market,
by offering a reward to consumers conditional on buying from both firms in the
coalition. Then, the prominent firm can extract the extra profits generated in the
other market through a fixed fee. In equilibrium, even if the coalition firms charge
higher prices, both consumers and the coalition are better off. In contrast, the rest
of the firms in both markets are worse off. The main intuition on why consumers
are better is that the coalition is profitable only if consumer surplus is higher when
consumers sample their firms first. Otherwise, consumers would never sample the
coalition. They would only search for the other firms that charge lower prices and
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offer no reward.
Then, we extend our model to study competing CLPs. We show that, when the
value of the reward offered to consumers is relatively high, consumers always buy
from firms in the same coalition. As in this case, every firm charges a high price,
and consumers are locked into the firms in the CLP to get the reward, consumers
end up worse than in a case without CLPs. Therefore, consumer surplus goes
down when CLPs compete.
As an extension, we study the case where half of the consumers start in each
market. We show that the main intuitions remain the same as in the case with a
dominant firm CLP. A full characterization of this case and the relative profitability
of this CLP relative to the dominant firm CLP is left for further research.
For simplicity, we assumed that each market has an infinite number of competi-
tors outside the CLP. This simplifies the analysis and allows us to understand the
basic incentives of consumers and the firms in the CLP while shutting down the
strategic reaction from the other firms in each market. In a more general analysis,
a finite number of competitors in each market would generate a price reaction,
where the non-prominent firms would likely increase their prices in reaction to
the CLP, as shown by Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009). In such a context,
while our results on the profitability of the CLP should be qualitatively similar,
our results concerning consumer surplus and total welfare might change. Also, we
assumed that both the search cost and the distribution of match values are the
same in both markets. Further research should take into account these potential
differences, as they should be important to understand the effects of CLPs.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The expected reward of a consumer buying from firm A1 is the expected consumer
surplus in t = 2 relative to the case where he doesn’t buy from firm A1. It
is composed by the expected match value he will obtain in his search process,
the expected price he will pay and the expected search costs he will face. As a
reference, we compute first the expected match value of not buying in firm A1.
In this case, a consumer will follow the standard search rule and buy when he
finds a match value greater than a. Therefore, his expected match value is 1+a2
which is the conditional expectation on the match value being greater than a. The
expected price he will pay is p∗2A = 1 − a and the expected search cost is s1−a ,
which is the weighted probability of stopping at the first firm sampled, the second,
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etc. Using the fact that s = (1−a)
2
2 , summing the three terms lead to an expected
consumer surplus of 2a − 1, which is the standard result in Wolinsky (1986) and
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) with infinite firms and uniform distribution.
With the CLP, if a consumer bought in A1, he will buy in B1 if and only if
εiB1 − p∗B1 ≥ a− p∗2B − T or if and only if
εB1 ≥ a− φB , (31)
where φB = T−αC2 . Therefore, its expected match value is MB1 =
1+a−φB
2 if
he buys from firm B1 and 1+a2 if he doesn’t. The probability of him buying from
firm B1 is 1−a+φB . The expected price he pays is p∗B1−T if he buys from B1 and
1−a if he doesn’t. He faces one time the search cost s if he buys from firm B1 and
s(1 + 11−a ) if he doesn’t. Summing all terms weighted by their probability leads
to an expected consumer surplus of 2a− 1 +φB(1−a)φ
2
B
2 . The expected reward is
therefore the difference between this and the case where a consumer doesn’t buy
from B1 given by 2a− 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
We follow the same steps as in Lemma 1. Condition on buying from the CLP, in
the second period consumers buy if and only if ε ≥ a − p∗2 + p∗1 − T . Therefore,
their expected match value is given by 2a+p
∗
1−T
2 if the buy from the CLP. This
happens with probability P1 = 2(1 − a) − p∗1 + T . If they buy from any of the
other firms, consumers get an expected match value of 1+a2 . This happens with
probability P2 = 2a − 1 + p∗1 − T . The expected price is given by p∗1 − T if the
buy from the CLP and 1− a otherwise. The expected search costs are given by s
if the buy in the CLP and s+ s1−a if they don’t. We weighted sum of these terms
is given by:





2 − a+ 12 (32)
The expected reward is therefore the difference between this and the case where
a consumer doesn’t buy from B1 given by 2a− 1, as shown in Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
The expected consumer surplus before joining any market is computed in a similar
fashion than in Lemma 1 but also considering the different possibilities in t = 1.
A consumer will buy from A1 if and only if εiA1 − pA1 ≥ a− p2A − ER or
εiA1 ≥ a− φa, (33)
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where
φA = (1− a)
(









Therefore, the probability of buying from A1 is 1− a+ φA. Following Lemma
1, the probability of buying from 2B conditional on having bought from A1 is
1− a+ φB . Therefore, there are three options for consumers:
• Buy from A1 and B1, with probability PAB = (1− a+ φA)(1− a+ φB).
• Buy from A1 and in a non-prominent firm in market B with probability
PAN = (1− a+ φA)(a− φB).
• Buy from non-prominent firms in both markets with probability PNN =
a− φA.
Note that consumers never buy from a non-prominent firm in market A and
then in firm B1, as this firm is never sampled by those consumers as it is expected
to charge a higher price and consumers can not obtain a reward. The expected
consumer surplus is composed by three terms: i) expected match value, ii) expected
price and iii) expected search costs.
Expected match value: If consumers buy from those firms, they obtain a match
value given by the expectation of the distribution of match values conditional on
εiA1 ≥ a−φa which is given byMA1 = 1+a−φA2 . Similarly, if the buy from firm B1
it is given by MB1 = 1+a−φB2 , and from buying from a non-prominent firm equal
to MN = 1+a2 . Therefore, the expected match value is given by
EMV = PAB(MA1 +MB1) + PAN (MA1 +MN ) + PNN (2MN ) (35)
which is equal to
EMV = 1 + a− φA2 (1− a+ φA)−
φB
2 (1− a+ φA)(1− a+ φB) (36)
Expected price: The expected price is given by p∗A1 + p∗B1 − T if they buy from
both firms, p∗A1 + 1− a if the buy only from firm A1 and 2(1− a) if they buy only
from prominent firms. Therefore, the expected price is given by
EP = PAB(p∗A1 + p∗B1 − T ) + PAN (p∗A1 + 1− a) + PNN (2(1− a)) (37)
which is equal to
EP = 2(1− a)− (1− a+ φA)
(
(1− a)T − (2− α)C4 + φB





Expected search costs: In the first case, consumers face a search cost of 2s, in
the second case 2s+ s1−a and in the third case
2s
1−a . Therefore, the expected search
costs is given by
ESC = PAB(2s) + PAN (2s+
s
1− a ) + PNN (
2s
1− a ) (39)
which is equal to
ESC = 1− a− φA2 (1− a)−
φB(1− a)(1− a+ φA)
2 (40)
Using the fact that s = (1−a)
2
2 and summing the three terms leads to 4a− 2 +
φA(1− a) + φ
2
A
2 . Note that consumers are buying in two markets, the benchmark
case without CLP is given by 4a− 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, note that D∗A1 = 1− a+ φA and CS = 4a− 2 + φA(1− a) +
φ2A
2 . Consumer
surplus is greater than in a case with no CLP if φA ≥ 0 or if φA is negative enough.
But if φA is that negative, then D∗A1 ≤ 0. Therefore CS increases if and only if
φA ≥ 0. This means that D∗A1 increases and therefore Π∗A1 increases and so the
profits of firm B1. This condition is equivalent to
(4T − 8C)(1− a) + T (T − 4C) + αC(4(1− a) + 2T + 4C)− 3α2C2 ≥ 0. (41)
If this condition holds, the both consumer surplus and the CLP profits increase.
Therefore, for a fixed level of α and C, if T is high enough, the left hand side is
greater than 0, provided C is not too high.
For the comparative statics, it is enough to differentiate with respect to α, T
and C and see that the LHS increases with α and decreases with a and C.
Proof of Proposition 3
Total industry profit is given by the sum of the profits from the non-prominent
firms in each market plus the profits of the firms in the coalition. The profits
from the non-prominent firms in market A are given by (a− φa)(1− a), from the
non-prominent firms in market B by (1− (1− a+φA)(1− a+φB)), from firm A1
by (1 − a + φA)2 and from firm B1 by (1 − a + φA)(1 − a + φB)2. Summing all
terms lead to a total industry profit of
Π = 2(1− a) + φA(1− a+ φA) + (1− a+ φA)(1− a+ φB)φB (42)
which is greater than in the case without CLP if the program is profitable.
As industry profits and consumer surplus increase in this case, total welfare also
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increases.
Proof of Proposition 4
For simplicity in the exposition, we provide the proof assuming that α = 1 and
then explain why it extends to any α. When α = 1, we have that the profits of firm
B1 in the CLP case can be written as a function of the profits of A1 in the SLP
case, or Π∗B1 = D∗A1ΠS∗A1. As the joint profits of the CLP are given by Π∗A1 + Π∗B1,
we have that if D∗A1 is big enough, then the profits of the CLP will exceed the
profits of the SLP.
We need to verify that this can indeed happen under the parametric restrictions
of our model. Suppose a = 12 , which is the case generating the least profits for
the CLP. Taking a value of C very small, approaching zero, and a big value of
T , approaching one, we have that D∗A1 = 1116 and D
∗
B1 = 1. The joint profits of




(1− a) + T−αC2
)2] or 1116 2716 ≈ 1.16 while the
profits of the SLP are equal to 1. Therefore, if C is not too high, if T is high
enough then the CLP is more profitable.
This result extends for any α because, if α = 1 is not maximizing the profits
of the CLP, than the optimal α increases its profits. and the argument still holds.
Proof of Proposition 5
First we compute the consumer surplus. We have p∗A = 1 − a + (1 − α)C and
p∗B = 1 + αC + T − a.
Expected match value: At t = 2, consumers always buy the product from the
firm in the coalition they bought in market A. Therefore, their expected match
value is always 12 . In the first period, as all firms charge the same price and offer
the same reward, their expected match value is the same is the case with no CLPs,
or 1+a2 .
Expected price: For every consumer the expected price is p∗A + p∗B − T =
2(1− a) + C.
Expected search cost: in the first period, the expected search cost is the same
as in the case with no CLP, given by s1−a . In the second period, the only search
once, therefore their expected search cost is s. Remembering that s = (1−a)
2
2 we





Summing all terms leads to




while the CS in the case with no CLP is 4a− 2. Therefore, CS always goes down
with competing CLPs.
Industry profits are equal to (1− a) in market A and equal to 1 in market B.
Total industry profits are 2 − a which is greater than 2 − 2a in the case with no
CLPs.
Total welfare is equal to
W = 3a− a
2
2 − C, (44)




2 − C ≥ 0. (45)
For the parametric restrictions on a, it is easy to check that if C is small enough
(close to 0), this condition is always satisfied, while if C > 12 , this condition is never
satisfied. Therefore, total welfare can increase or decrease depending on the value
of C.
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